Antitrust Issues for Lawyers Representing Small Businesses by Blakely, Alan F.
Montana Law Review
Volume 54
Issue 2 Summer 1993 Article 2
July 1993
Antitrust Issues for Lawyers Representing Small
Businesses
Alan F. Blakely
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Montana Law
Review by an authorized editor of The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law.
Recommended Citation
Alan F. Blakely, Antitrust Issues for Lawyers Representing Small Businesses, 54 Mont. L. Rev. (1993).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr/vol54/iss2/2
ANTITRUST ISSUES FOR LAWYERS
REPRESENTING SMALL BUSINESSES
Alan F. Blakley*
I. Introduction ..................................... 226
II. Federal Statutes Provide the Greatest Body of Anti-
trust L aw .................... .................. 228
A. The Primary Source of Antitrust Law is the
Sherm an A ct ............................... 229
1. First Inquire Whether an Activity is Per Se
U nreasonable ............................ 230
a. Competitors May Not Agree to Set
P rices .............................. 232
b. Dividing Markets Among Competitors is
a Per Se Violation ................... 233
c. Groups of Businesses May Not Boycott 234
d. Individual Businesses May Not Force
Others to Use Undesirable Products... 235
e. Conscious Fluctuation of Prices to De-
stroy Competition is Illegal ........... 236
f. Courts Have Specified Other Activities
as Per Se Unreasonable .............. 237
2. Activities Which Are Not Per Se Unreasona-
ble May Still Be Prohibited .............. 238
3. Intentionally Attempting to Maintain or Ac-
quire a Monopoly is Forbidden ........... 240
B. The Clayton Act Primarily Addresses Mergers 243
C. The Sherman and Clayton Acts May Be En-
forced by the United States, the States, and Pri-
vate P ersons ................................ 246
D. Other Federal Laws Supplement the Sherman
and Clayton Acts ...................... .... 246
1. Sellers May Not Discriminate in Price
Am ong Buyers .......................... 247
2. Many Agricultural Endeavors are Exempt
from Federal Antitrust Law .............. 248
* A.B., Davidson College; J.D., Salmon P. Chase College of Law. The author practices
in Missoula, is a member of the American Bar Association Section on Antitrust, and has an
avid interest in the interface between economics and law. See Alan F. Blakley, The Cost of
Killing Criminals, 18 N. Ky. L. REV. 61 (1990). The author wishes to thank Missoula lawyers
Bob Mullendore and Bill Watt for their past support of the author's antitrust work and for
their continuing professional friendship.
1
Blakely: Antitrust Issues for Lawyers Representing Small Businesses
Published by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law, 1993
MONTANA LAW REVIEW
3. Special Laws Apply to Packers and Stock-
y ard s ................................... 24 9
4. A Special Federal Commission Oversees An-
titrust Enforcement .... ................. 251
5. Certain Mergers Trigger Greater Scrutiny.. 251
III. A State's Antitrust Statutes May Supplement the
F ederal L aw ..................................... 252
IV. Potential Liability of Small Businesses ............. 254
A. Small Businesses Have Attributes that Increase
Some Antitrust Risks ........................ 255
1. Small Businesses May Be Trapped Between
Monopolists and Consumers .............. 256
2. Sometimes Small Business Entrepreneurial
Spirit May Cause Problems ............... 258
B. Four Temptations of Small Businesses that
Could Trigger Liability ..................... 258
1. P rice F ixing ............................. 259
2. T yin g .................................. 259
3. M arket Allocations ...................... 260
4. M ergers ................................ 261
C. Enforcement Against Small Businesses Is Be-
coming a Growing Concern ................... 262
V. Using Antitrust Laws to Benefit a Small Business... 265
A. Antitrust Laws Help Small Businesses Enter
Markets Dominated by Monopolists .......... 265
B. Antitrust Laws Help Small Businesses Defend
Their Market Positions Against Large Busi-
n esses .. .. ... .... ... .. ..... .. ... .... .. ... . 2 6 9
VI. Conclusion ................................. 273
I. INTRODUCTION
Most small business clients believe that antitrust laws are
largely irrelevant to them. Antitrust issues seem to have been set-
tled long ago by the trust busters or to involve huge national com-
panies like Cargill,' du Pont,2 or IBM.' Even when an antitrust
lawsuit has a dramatic impact on a small business client, that cli-
ent frequently sees it as a battle among giants while the small busi-
ness watches from the sidelines.'
1. See Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo. Inc., 479 U.S. 104 (1986).
2. See United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586 (1957).
3. See Transamerica Computer Co. v. International Business Mach. Corp., 698 F.2d
1377 (9th Cir. 1983).
4. For instance, even though many states, through their Attorneys General, were par-
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Antitrust laws frequently have significant impacts on small
businesses.5 Sometimes the antitrust laws are used by small busi-
nesses to gain protection from the economic power of large, na-
tional companies. For instance, in Martin B. Glauser Dodge Co. v.
Chrysler Corp.,6 an automobile dealership sued a national com-
pany to ensure that the national company's new policies did not
injure the dealership's place in the market.'
Small businesses can also find themselves as defendants in an-
titrust lawsuits even when they follow what they consider to be
normal business operations.8 Even professionals carrying on their
businesses can be subject to enforcement actions based on the an-
titrust laws.9 The antitrust laws can become traps for the unwary ' °
or those not paying proper attention."
Courts give consumers the best access for enforcing antitrust
laws against national companies," and consumers seem to have the
best chance of success in the enforcement arena despite special
rules regarding standing to bring suit.' 3 Through careful and
ties to the lawsuit against Nintendo on behalf of consumers, New York v. Nintendo of Am.,
Inc., 775 F. Supp. 676 (S.D.N.Y. 1991), most acted as silent partners, entering after the
lawsuit had been instituted by the larger states. This lawsuit, which was settled and pro-
vided a modest settlement for all Nintendo customers, did not make a great impression in
many places. As another example, in Montana even the lawsuit in which its Buttrey stores
were removed from the conglomerate that had owned them did not make many headlines.
See California v. American Stores Co., 495 U.S. 271 (1990).
5. Throughout this Article examples are drawn from small Montana businesses. How-
ever, any of the examples are equally as applicable in other states. Most small businesses
share attitudes that antitrust is only marginally relevant. However, sometimes the small
business may be unpleasantly surprised. See United States v. Missouri River Marine, Inc.,
Cr. No. 91-34-GF (D. Mont. Sept. 19, 1991) (involving a Montana business), noted in Mar-
keters of Branded Boats Must Defend Customer and Territory Allocation Charges, 61 An-
titrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1534, at 364 (1991). See also Martin B. Glauser Dodge
Co. v. Chrysler Corp., 570 F.2d 72 (3d Cir. 1977) (involving a local company against a na-
tional giant).
6. 570 F.2d 72 (3d Cir. 1977).
7. Id. at 79.
8. For instance, in Holly Sugar Corp. v. Goshen County Co-op Beet Growers Ass'n.,
725 F.2d 564, 566 (10th Cir. 1984), an agricultural co-op continued to attempt to convince
additional persons to join the co-op. The co-op wished to rely upon the exemption to the
antitrust laws granted by the Capper-Volstead Act. See infra notes 199-208 and accompany-
ing text. However, the court held that the agricultural exemption was not absolute, and if
the plaintiffs could produce proper evidence of coercion or other prohibited practices, the
co-op's actions would fall outside the exemption.
9. See FTC v. Indiana Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447 (1986). Even groups of lawyers
(albeit criminal defense lawyers) have found themselves afoul of the antitrust laws: See FTC
v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 493 U.S. 411 (1990).
10. See Holly Sugar, 725 F.2d 564.
11. See Superior Court Trial Lawyers, 493 U.S. 411.
12. See Blue Shield of Va. v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465 (1982) (consumer brought a
lawsuit against a national health insurance giant).
13. See Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 337 n.3 (1979) (in which the special
3
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thoughtful use of antitrust laws, small businesses can protect
themselves from the advantages that large companies derive from
their economies of scale, market positions, and wealth, and prevail
against large multinational corporations.1 4 A small business need
not even file a lawsuit, however, to obtain the protection of the
antitrust laws.1 5
The business lawyer must look to a .wide variety of sources to
understand antitrust law. Typically, the primary body of law is
federal statutory antitrust law. However, additional federal stat-
utes supplement that antitrust law. Most states have enacted anti-
trust statutes that parallel the federal law. This Article begins with
an overview of the vast body of federal statutory law and judicial
interpretations, which are overtly devoted to antitrust. This Article
then describes some of the other federal law that affects antitrust.
Montana's antitrust statutes provide an example of one state's
antitrust scheme. This Article describes those statutes to provide
an alternative base of antitrust liability and enforcement. After the
law has been described, several examples provide an opportunity
to discover the potential antitrust liability of small businesses and
potential uses of antitrust law to benefit such businesses.
II. FEDERAL STATUTES PROVIDE THE GREATEST BODY OF
ANTITRUST LAW16
By far the greatest volume of antitrust law derives from fed-
eral statutes. Consequently, this Part of this Article is necessarily
lengthy. The two greatest sources of antitrust law, the Sherman
Act of 18907 and the Clayton Act of 1914,18 became the basis of all
"standing rules" developed in Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 745-46 (1977), and
discussed infra at text accompanying notes 274-81, were curiously not enforced as to con-
sumers only because those rules were not raised on appeal; the Court seems to ignore the
rule that subject matter jurisdiction may always be raised).
14. See Hasbrouck v. Texaco, Inc., 631 F. Supp. 258 (E.D. Wash. 1986) (gasoline sta-
tions brought an antitrust action against the national petroleum company and, after prevail-
ing, recovered their attorney fees from Texaco).
15. This topic is expanded infra part V.
16. Representative cases illustrating particular points, included in footnotes, are cho-
sen for their analysis, not necessarily for their precedential value in any particular circuit.
Long strings of citations are not included. Practitioners are urged to read the cited cases as
well as later cases, United States Supreme Court cases, and cases from their particular juris-
dictions, which in some instances may slightly differ. For instance, those practitioners in the
Ninth Circuit, on reviewing applicable law, would find that it is the only circuit that may
not always require a market analysis prior to finding a dangerous probability of success in
attempted monopolization cases. See Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 113 S. Ct. 884
(1992); William Inglis & Sons Baking Co. v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 668 F.2d 1014,
1029-30 (9th Cir. 1981); infra notes 153-54 and accompanying text.
17. 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1988)).
[Vol. 54
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antitrust liability and enforcement. This Part describes those laws,
as interpreted by the courts, in some detail. Other laws enacted by
the United States supplement these two acts. This Part ends with
a brief treatment of some of those laws particularly applicable to
small businesses.' 9
A. The Primary Source of Antitrust Law is the Sherman Act
The Sherman Act of 189020 constitutes the oldest body of fed-
eral antitrust statutory law. The Act literally prohibits every con-
tract, combination, or conspiracy that in any way restrains trade."
The United States Supreme Court held, at a very early date, that
only unreasonable restraints of trade were prohibited by the Sher-
man Act.22 Yet it decided that courts need not consider the reason-
ableness of every business action independently each time a viola-
tion was alleged. Consequently, the Court developed a list of
business activities that are always considered to be unreasonable.23
The Supreme Court's decisions created a dichotomy between
those activities that are always unreasonable restraints of trade24
and those that may or may not be unreasonable.25 An understand-
ing of this dichotomy is critical to an understanding of antitrust
law. The characterization of an arrangement as either always un-
reasonable (known as a per se offense),2 6 or as sometimes unrea-
sonable (known as a "Rule of Reason" case) 27 is perhaps the most
important factor in evaluating a potential Sherman Act claim.
18. 38 Stat. 730 (1914) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 12 (1988)).
19. Some elements of antitrust law are not discussed in this article because they typi-
cally do not impact small businesses. Two areas omitted are criminal liability and the labor
exemption to antitrust laws.
20. 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1988)).
21. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1988). The courts quickly realized that virtually every agreement
between two businesses places some restraint on trade. See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. v. United
States, 221 U.S. 1, 63 (1911). Congress, the courts reasoned, could not have intended to
outlaw all contracts or agreements that restrain trade since that would, in essence, destroy
American business competition. See Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238
(1918).
22. Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at 63-67.
23. See, e.g., United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 210-11, 218, 222-
23 (1940); Fashion Originators' Guild v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457, 467-68 (1941).
24. Fashion Originators', 312 U.S. at 468.
25. See National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 99-101
(1984).
26. Fashion Originators', 312 U.S. at 467-68.
27. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. at 103. If activity fits within the definition of a per se
offense, the courts automatically hold the activity is an unreasonable restraint of trade.
However, if the actions do not constitute such a per se offense, the inquiry is not finished.
The courts determine whether the activity is reasonable. Applying these rules of reasonable-
ness led to the characterization of those cases as "Rule of Reason" cases.
1993]
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1. First Inquire Whether an Activity is Per Se Unreasonable
If an action taken by a business fits within the definition of a
per se offense, such a business will almost always be held liable for
the antitrust violation.2 For instance, if two competing businesses
selling the same product agree to set prices on that product, the
businesses have committed a per se offense.2 9 These businesses
cannot defend their actions in any way, not even by showing that
their prices are reasonable or even lower than they otherwise
would be.3°
The most frequently litigated questions in per se cases concern
whether or not a particular activity fits within the definition of the
particular per se offense. For instance, in Arizona v. Maricopa
County Medical Society,31 the United States Supreme Court con-
sidered whether an agreement between two independent groups of
doctors to set the maximum fees they would charge amounted to a
per se violation.32 The Ninth Circuit had held that it did not.3
Even though the doctors argued that they were not really fixing
prices, 4 the Supreme Court held that their activity fit within the
definition of price-fixing and was, therefore, per se illegal.3 5
Competitors may also respond to a price fixing charge by
claiming that they independently adopted each other's price. This
is called "conscious parallelism."3 6 "Conscious parallelism" is not a
per se violation of the Sherman Act. 7 For instance, in Maricopa
County,38 if one of the groups of doctors had known of the other's
maximum rates and chosen to adopt those rates, this consciously
parallel pricing of identical services would not necessarily have
constituted a violation of the antitrust laws. 9 Something more
28. Fashion Originators', 312 U.S. at 468.
29. Id. at 466-67.
30. Id. at 467. The Supreme Court has explained this relative harshness, in the con-
text of a different per se violation, by reasoning that "Itihe reasonable price fixed today may
through economic and business changes become the unreasonable price of tomorrow."
United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392, 397 (1927). The monopoly power
gained through such actions can later be used to extract monopoly rents and perform other
actions that only a monopolist has the power to perform in manipulating the market. Id. at
397-98.
31. 457 U.S. 332 (1982).
32. Id. at 335-36.
33. Id. at 337-38.
34. Id. at 355.
35. Id. at 356-57.
36. Theater Enterprises, Inc. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 346 U.S. 537, 541
(1954).
37. Id. at 541.
38. 457 U.S. 332.
39. See E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. FTC, 729 F.2d 128, 136 (2d Cir. 1984); In re
[Vol. 54
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would need to be proved to sustain an antitrust violation. The
courts will not find conscious parallelism, however, but rather per
se horizontal price fixing if behavior such as communication be-
tween competitors, a radical departure from prior business prac-
tices, lack of legitimate business reasons for the parallel action, or
artificial standardization of products or services exists. 0 Parallel
behavior that is inconsistent with behavior to be expected from in-
dependent participants individually pursuing their own economic
interests may lead to the inference of the existence of agreement or
concerted action and, thus, constitutes a per se offense."
Courts must draw a fine line between "competition on the
merits" and conduct that constitutes per se offenses."' Many times
courts will find seemingly insignificant factors sufficient to place a
business's activity on one side or the other of that line.4 3 The po-
tential defendant must seek to have its conduct classified as
healthy competition, while the plaintiff wishes to define the de-
fendant's conduct as a per se offense.4 5
The following subsections provide a brief overview of a few
common activities that are classified as per se offenses by most
courts. Businesses must avoid even the appearance of engaging in
these sorts of activities because litigation to show that no per se
offense has occurred is quite time consuming and costly."' Those
offenses described below are most frequently encountered by small
Beef Indus. Antitrust Litig., 713 F. Supp. 971, 974 (N.D. Tex. 1989), aff'd, 907 F.2d 510 (5th
Cir. 1990).
40. See United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 448-49 (1978) (dis-
cussing these factors and how the courts apply them); United States v. Container Corp. of
Am., 393 U.S. 333, 337 (1969).
41. Container Corp., 393 U.S. at 337-38.
42. See Transamerica Computer Co. v. International Business Mach. Corp., 698 F.2d
1377, 1384 (9th Cir. 1983).
43. See, e.g., Times-Picayune Pub. Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594 (1956) (charac-
terizing behavior, which could be defined as per se illegal "tying," as good, healthy competi-
tion). See infra text accompanying notes 83-92 for discussion of "tying." The Court is fond
of saying that the antitrust laws are to protect competition, not competitors even though it
never provides a convincing explanation of the differences. See, e.g., Cargill Inc. v. Monfort
of Colo. Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 115-16 (discussion of the Clayton Act is saturated with the
Court's dogma that all antitrust laws are to promote competition and to benefit consumers,
rather than to protect other competitors but nowhere does the Court explain why protecting
competitors and promoting competition are independent).
44. See, e.g., FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 493 U.S. 411, 426 (1990)
(involving defendants who were not successful in having their behavior characterized as a
promotion of healthy competition and in furtherance of the needs of consumers of their
services).
45. See, e.g., Times-Picayune, 345 U.S. at 614 (involving the plaintiff United States'
unsuccessful attempt to have the newspaper's behavior characterized as illegal tying).
46. See, e.g., Cargill, 479 U.S. at 107-08.
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businesses. 7
a. Competitors May Not Agree to Set Prices
Horizontal price fixing among competitors is one of the most
blatant and common examples of a Sherman Act violation.'8 A per
se violation occurs any time two competitors agree to set a price
that has the effect of raising, depressing, fixing, pegging, or stabi-
lizing prices . 9 "Any combination [group of one or more competi-
tors] which tampers with price structures is engaged in an unlawful
activity. '50 As described above, once it is shown that competitors
have agreed to fix the price, the activity is illegal whether the
prices fixed are reasonable, low, 51 or even if the behavior is
designed to foster a public good.52 Furthermore, the price fixing
need not be based upon an expressed written agreement but can be
implied by the conduct of the parties. 3
Most businesses realize that they may not engage in horizontal
price fixing. But vertical price fixing may also be a per se viola-
tion.5 Illegal vertical price fixing occurs when a business fixes
prices with another business that is not a competitor but is else-
where in the chain of production or distribution.5 This can occur
without either business being conscious of committing a violation.
Prior to Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp., the law was
relatively clear that any scheme to fix either a minimum or a maxi-
mum resale price whether horizontally or vertically was illegal."1
The Rehnquist Court was asked to reconsider whether resale price
maintenance was a per se violation in Monsanto.57 While the Court
reaffirmed the per se nature of such offenses, it dramatically
changed the law of resale price maintenance.58
47. The best treatise on antitrust is JULIAN 0. VON KALINOWSKI, ANTITRUST AND TRADE
REGULATION (1993). This treatise has sixteen volumes and is updated frequently. It provides
expansive descriptions of most per se offenses.
48. See Socony-Vacuum, 310 U.S. at 219-20.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 221. See also Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13 (1962).
51. Maricopa County, 457 U.S. at 351.
52. See Fashion Originators, 312 U.S. at 468 (holding that the public good of eliminat-
ing companies illegally pirating clothing designs was not sufficient to justify a per se anti-
trust violation).
53. See, e.g., Container Corp., 393 U.S. at 334-35; U.S. Gypsum, 438 U.S. at 429.
54. Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp., 465 U.S. 752 (1984).
55. Id. at 761. Vertical price fixing, also known as resale price maintenance, is per se
illegal. United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919).
56. See Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 151-52 (1968); Dr. Miles Medical Co. v.
John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373, 408 (1911).
57. Monsanto, 465 U.S. at 759.
58. Spray-Rite, a distributor and discounter of Monsanto's products, brought suit
232 [Vol. 54
8
Montana Law Review, Vol. 54 [1993], Iss. 2, Art. 2
https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr/vol54/iss2/2
1993] SMALL BUSINESS ANTITRUST ISSUES
Following Monsanto, it is only per se illegal to terminate a
price cutting dealer where that termination is pursuant to an
agreement with those in competition with the terminated dealer,
and where the purpose is setting a price or price level.5 9 Mon-
santo's teaching allows a supplier to announce its resale prices in
advance and unilaterally refuse to deal with those who fail to com-
ply, even if that supplier's decision is a result of complaints from
other customers.6 0 The business must be careful in how it explains
its business practices to its customers.6 ' Congress has attempted to
overrule Monsanto's evidentiary standards repeatedly but with no
success to date. 2 It is possible that such a bill could become law
shortly, under the new administration."
b. Dividing Markets Among Competitors is a Per Se
Violation
Not only may competitors not agree to set prices, but they
may not agree among themselves to divide customers or territo-
ries." ' A market allocation occurs when two or more competitors
against Monsanto alleging that Monsanto and several other distributors conspired to elimi-
nate Spray-Rite as a distributor because it was also a discounter. Id. at 757. Spray-Rite had
been selling Monsanto for many years at reduced prices. Id. at 756. Following Monsanto's
receipt of complaints from those other distributors, Monsanto refused to renew its contract
to supply goods to Spray-Rite. While the Supreme Court upheld this as an illegal resale
price maintenance offense, the Court held that the evidentiary standard applied in these
cases is so strict as practically to preclude resale price maintenance cases. Id. at 764. The
Court held that the act of a supplier, acting against a customer based upon complaints from
other customers, in terminating its sale of goods to that customer, is not in itself a per se
offense. Id. Something more than complaints on the parts of other customers must be
shown. Id. at 763-64. The plaintiff must show that its supplier and those complaining of the
prices were not acting independently, id. at 764, and must produce some evidence, whether
direct or circumstantial, that tends to show that the supplier and those complaining formed
some sort of combination or conspiracy to achieve an unlawful objective. Id.
59. See Business Electronics Corp. v. Sharp Electronics Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 726-27
(1988).
60. Monsanto, 465 U.S. at 764.
61. Nevertheless, consumers like discounts. While a supplier may legally terminate a
dealer selling at discount, it may not be wise to do so.
62. See Freedom from Vertical Price Fixing Act of 1987, H.R. 585, 100th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1987), and the Price Fixing Prevention Act of 1991, H.R. 1470, 102d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1991). Each time the bill is introduced, it seems to gather more support. For instance, see
the report in Bill to Alter Standard in RPM Cases Approved by House Judiciary Commit-
tee, 60 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1522, at 877 (1991).
63. Bush Administration Acting Assistant Attorney General Charles A. James, just af-
ter the election, wondered how legislation to repeal Monsanto would fare under the Clinton
Administration. See Antitrust Agency Heads Cite Guidelines as Major Administration Ac-
complishment, 63 Antitrust Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1590, at 584 (1992).
64. Such a division is known as a "horizontal market allocation" because the competi-
tors are on the same level in the chain of production or service in the industry. If the two
participants are at different levels, for instance, wholesaler and retailer, any arrangement is
9
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agree on which of their customers will be served by which competi-
tor based on identifiable factors: geography, products to be sold, or
any other identifiable reason. 5 Unlike price fixing which is per se
illegal whether horizontal or vertical, vertical market allocation is
not a per se violation, while horizontal market allocation is. 6 Of
course, the Sherman Act may be violated by vertical allocations
under the Rule of Reason test.6 7 The practitioner must be aware of
potential market allocations and help businesses avoid them. It
may not always be obvious whether an arrangement is a horizontal
allocation, which is a per se violation, or a vertical allocation,
which is not.6 '
In United States v. Topco Associates, Inc., a chain of inde-
pendent grocers agreed to sell Topco brand products in such a way
that the independent grocers would not be in competition with
each other for the sales within a particular territory. 9 The Topco
associated stores merely sought to allocate the territory so that
they could compete more effectively with national and regional
chains.7 0 The Supreme Court held that because no Topco grocer
could sell Topco products in the territory of another Topco grocer
without that second grocer's permission, a per se illegal horizontal
market allocation had occurred.71
c. Groups of Businesses May Not Boycott
While price fixing and market allocations are proactive viola-
tions, reactions such as group boycotts and refusals to deal are also
per se offenses." These offenses include agreements to refuse to do
business with a third party.73 Frequently, this third party is a com-
petitor whose practices are disagreeable to the offenders.74 For in-
called "vertical."
65. United States v. Topco Assocs. Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 608 (1972).
66. Id. at 612. Vertical market allocations include such arrangements as exclusive ter-
ritorial rights to sell granted by a supplier to a dealer.
67. One of the strangest quasi vertical market allocation cases but one that provides
significant insights is Northrop Corp. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 498 F. Supp. 1112 (C.D.
Cal. 1980).
68. For instance, in a different context, a parent company and a subsidiary company
may or may not be horizontal. In Acme Refrigeration of Baton Rouge, Inc. v. Whirlpool
Corp., 785 F.2d 1240 (5th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 848 (1987), a parent, in the
context of the Robinson Patman Act, did not control its subsidiary's activities, therefore,
the two were considered independent and presumably "horizontal."
69. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. at 600.
70. Id. at 599.
71. Id. at 612.
72. Fashion Originators, 312 U.S. at 468.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 461.
[Vol. 54
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stance, in Fashion Originators Guild v. FTC, a group of garment
manufacturers entered into an agreement not to sell garments to
department stores that did business with manufacturers who were
allegedly pirating designs.78 As with all other per se offenses, the
antitrust violation was not justified by the public good of attempt-
ing to eliminate illegal conduct by the design pirates.7 6 There are
no defenses to the per se violations and no balancing of the public
good is allowed."
FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Association7 8 illustrates
the harshness of the per se rule. In that case, the public defenders
of the District of Columbia refused to take cases until their hourly
rates were increased.7 9 The Court held that this was a per se anti-
trust offense,"0 a refusal to deal, in violation of the Sherman Act
even though the attorneys' compensation was found to be dread-
fully low and even though the attorneys argued that they needed
more pay to give their indigent clients constitutionally adequate
representation. These public goods were termed immaterial to
the outcome of the case.82
d. Individual Businesses May Not Force Others to Use Un-
desirable Products
Tying occurs when one business with market power over one
product or service refuses to sell that product or service to a buyer
unless the buyer agrees to purchase a separate product or service
in which the seller also has a financial interest and which the buyer
does not want to purchase. 3 It is, therefore, a per se offense com-
mitted by an individual business.8'
In a classic tying case, Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v.
United States,85 the owner of both a morning and evening newspa-
75. Id.
76. Id. at 468.
77. Id.
78. 493 U.S. 411 (1990).
79. Id. at 416.
80. Id. at 434.
81. Id. at 424.
82. Id. Remember, however, that a violation requires an agreement, so that if one indi-
vidual attorney had decided to refuse to deal independently, no violation probably would
have occurred. Id. at 422-23. Additionally, the association was not a union so the labor ex-
emption under 15 U.S.C. § 17 could not be invoked.
83. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 305-06 (1949).
84. Id. An individual business need not always act in concert with another business as
in price fixing, market allocations, or group boycotts in order to commit an antitrust
violation.
85. 345 U.S. 594 (1953).
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per in the New Orleans market, 86 refused to allow advertisers to
advertise in either of its newspapers unless the advertiser bought
space in the Times-Picayune evening newspaper.8 7 The Supreme
Court held this not to be a tying offense, however, because it found
Times-Picayune lacked sufficient market power.8 8 It is important
to note that simply joining two products together is not necessarily
tying.8 The seller must have sufficient market power to force its
customers to accept the tying arrangement.90 Additionally, two dif-
ferent products must be involved 9' and the arrangement must un-
reasonably foreclose or restrain market competitors in the relevant
market."2
e. Conscious Fluctuation of Prices to Destroy Competition is
Illegal
While the greatest difficulty in all per se offenses is establish-
ing that the activity constitutes the prohibited conduct,9" it is most
significant in the realm of predatory pricing. In a pure, hypotheti-
cal predatory pricing case, one business will lower its prices drasti-
cally enough to drive its horizontal competitor out of the relevant
market and to create a monopoly.94 Once a monopoly is created,
86. The New Orleans newspaper market had only one other newspaper, an evening
newspaper. Id. at 596.
87. Id. at 596-97. Thus, the putative tying product is advertising in the morning news-
paper, and the tied product is advertising in the evening newspaper. The scheme would
have allegedly caused the other evening newspaper to lose the capacity to compete with the
Times-Picayune evening paper by tying advertising in the morning paper, which many ad-
vertisers wanted, to advertising in the Times-Picayune's evening paper, which they may not
have wanted.
88. Id. at 611. The case is particularly instructive, however, in that the Court explains
tying theory in great depth in order to distinguish Times-Picayune's behavior from both the
per se tying offense and the Rule of Reason offense of attempted monopoly based upon the
United States' claims. See infra text accompanying notes 105-28. It remains a seminal case
in tying law, in spite of the conclusion that Times-Picayune had committed no violation,
because of its sound teaching. It is a good case to read to learn how courts attempt to define
whether conduct fits within the definitions of per se offenses, as well as to gain an under-
standing of the application of the Rule of Reason.
89. Times-Picayune, 345 U.S. at 627.
90. Id. at 611.
91. Id. at 614. The Court also held that the Times-Picayune's actions did not fit
within the definition of tying because the two products in that case were identical. Id. The
Court determined that morning newspaper advertising and afternoon newspaper advertising
were not different products, but part of the same relevant product market. Id. See infra
notes 112-20 and accompanying text for a discussion of relevant product market and an
expanded explanation of the importance of carefully defining it and convincing the court to
accept that definition.
92. Id. at 614.
93. See, e.g., id.
94. See A.B.A. ANTITRUST SEC., Antitrust Law Developments 125-30 (2d ed. 1984).
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the predator will raise its prices significantly, extracting monopoly
rents. 5 In the real world, predatory pricing is extremely difficult to
prove because it is difficult to distinguish between price reductions
taken to increase competition and those which are intended to
harm competition." Courts have devised a series of intricate evi-
dentiary tests -to determine whether predatory pricing has oc-
curred. 7 The court in A.A. Poultry Farms describes the three most
widely used tests: (1) determining whether the price charged ex-
ceeds the cost to produce,9" (2) determining the pricer's intent,"9
and (3) determining whether the pricer is making an investment in
a future monopoly.100
f. Courts Have Specified Other Activities as Per Se
Unreasonable
The previous five examples are not an exclusive list of per se
offenses; a variety of others are defined by the courts. For instance,
bid rigging (where bidders plan in advance who will submit the low
bid) is sometimes considered part of price fixing and sometimes is
considered a separate per se offense. ' ' In any event, bid rigging is
a per se violation of the Sherman Act.10 2
Courts are likely to view as per se offenses anything that will
consistently and unreasonably restrain trade. However, courts have
been reluctant to expand the list of per se offenses in the recent
95. Id. Monopoly rents are the excess profits a monopolist reaps due solely to the
existence of the monopoly.
96. See Northeastern Tel. Co. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 651 F.2d 76 (2d Cir. 1981)
(illustrating the difficulty courts have with this distinction). The courts, based on public
policy, favor price reductions to increase competition. But, in many cases, such as North-
eastern Telephone, the courts must predict the future to decide whether the conduct
amounts to predatory pricing.
97. See A.A. Poultry Farms, Inc. v. Rose Acre Farms, Inc., 881 F.2d 1396, 1400-02
(7th Cir. 1989).
98. Id. at 1400.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 1401. As A.A. Poultry illustrates, the Seventh Circuit prefers a complex
test, dramatizing the difficulty of proving a predatory pricing case. Id. at 1401-02. Even if
the pricer is successful in defending its -practices, however, an incredible amount of defense
cost is involved in these evidence intensive lawsuits. See Northeastern Telephone, 651 F.2d
at 76. The practitioner is best advised to help the business client avoid any appearances of
predatory pricing.
101. Underground Construction Contractors Will Plead Guilty to Section 1 Allega-
tions, 60 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1522, at 884 (1991) (discussing United
States v. ICOS Corp. of Am., No. 91-151-D (W.D. Wash. June 20, 1991)).
102. Id. In ICOS Corp., ICOS Corporation was charged with bid rigging contracts with
the Army Corps of Engineers to repair the Mud Mountain Dam in Washington. ICOS had
agreed to pay each of the other bidders if they would allow ICOS to submit the low bid. Id.
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past.103 With proper planning and research, businesses will achieve
their legitimate ends while avoiding per se offenses.104
2. Activities Which Are Not Per Se Unreasonable May Still Be
Prohibited
Every other contract, combination, or conspiracy that re-
strains trade and is not conduct defined as a per se violation is
governed by the Rule of Reason.10 5 Almost any business activity
could be conducted so unreasonably as to violate the Sherman
Act.106 Potential violations have been considered so frequently that
the practitioner should be aware that courts are likely to find the
conduct to be an unreasonable restraint even if that conduct has
not yet been characterized as a per se offense. These activities
could become per se offenses: exclusive contracts which border on
tying arrangements,1 0 7 unilateral distributorship terminations,10 8
territorial market allocations,109 and unilateral refusals to deal. 110
The Rule of Reason case requires a higher degree of proof
than the per se offenses. 1 Some courts impose a threshold inquiry
into whether the alleged offender has substantial market power in
the relevant market. 12 This, of course, requires that "relevant
market" be defined. Relevant market has two components. The
first component is product market, defined as those products that
are reasonably interchangeable in terms of price, use, and quality.
Even though not identical or fungible, these products must be rea-
sonable substitutes.113 The definition of a relevant product market
103. See FTC v. Indiana Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 458 (1986); Jefferson Parish
Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 15-16 (1984).
104. For instance, as Monsanto teaches, a business can engage in behavior that results
in vertical price restraints without committing antitrust violations so long as the business
structures its actions properly. Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. at 763-64.
Examples can be found in all "per se offense categories" of achieving the results while not
committing the offense. See, e.g., Times-Picayune, 345 U.S. at 610-11.
105. See NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 103 (1984).
106. See Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918).
107. See Oltz v. St. Peter's Community Hosp., 861 F.2d 1440, 1448 (9th Cir. 1988).
108. See Monsanto, 465 U.S. at 764.
109. See Marketers of Branded Boats Must Defend Customer and Territory Alloca-
tion Charges, 61 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1534, at 364 (1991) (discussing
Missouri River Marine, No. 91-34-GF (D. Mont. Sept. 19, 1991)).
110. Trans Sport Inc. v. Starter Sportswear, Inc., 775 F. Supp. 536, 541-44 (N.D.N.Y.
1991), aff'd, 964 F.2d 186 (2d Cir. 1992).
111. NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. at 104 n.26.
112. See Assam Drug Co. v. Miller Brewing Co., 798 F.2d 311, 315-16 (8th Cir. 1986).
While this case is based upon South Dakota's antitrust law, federal case law is used to
supply South Dakota's law of the Rule of Reason. Id. at 315.
113. United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 392-95 (1956).
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typically requires the use of expert economists who conduct a
study known as "cross-elasticity of demand."1 ' A relevant product
market is defined by determining how likely a consumer is to
choose one product irrespective of availability or other concerns.
The second component of relevant market is the relevant geo-
graphic market. Generally, the Elzinga-Hogarty test" 5 is applied to
determine relevant geographic market. This test weighs such fac-
tors as the perishability of the product, shipping patterns, plant
locations, customer buying practices, transportation costs, and lo-
cation of sales persons. 116 Both the relevant product market and
the relevant geographic market can be defined very widely or very
narrowly. When combined, the overall relevant market can be
quite large or quite small.1 17
The court usually must find that the alleged monopolist holds
market power with respect to the relevant market. 1 8 If actual
proof of detrimental effects from the conduct of a business exists,
however, the court will not inquire into market power. 9 In FTC v.
Indiana Federation of Dentists, confronted with a conspiracy to
withhold information from consumers, the Court required only a
showing that the dentists caused some bad effects. The Court did
not inquire into market power because it found information neces-
114. For examples of cross-elasticity studies in the food industries, see generally FOOD
DEMAND ANALYSIS (Oral Capps, Jr. & Benjamin Senauer, eds. 1986) and THE ECONOMICS OF
MEAT DEMAND (Rueben C. Buse, ed. 1989). The question posed in a cross-elasticity study is
when will consumers choose a new product over an old product as factors such as price,
health, and availability make the old product less desirable, and which new products are
chosen first as substitutes.
115. The Elzinga-Hogarty test is named after Kenneth Elzinga and Thomas Hogarty
who wrote two particularly important articles about defining geographic markets. See Ken-
neth G. Elzinga & Thomas F. Hogarty, The Problem of Geographic Market Delineation in
Antimerger Suits, 18 ANTITRUST BULL. 45 (1973) [hereinafter Elzinga & Hogarty I]; Kenneth
G. Elzinga & Thomas F. Hogarty, The Problem of Geographic Market Delineation Revis-
ited: The Case of Coal, 23 ANTITRUST BULL. 1 (1978) [hereinafter Elzinga & Hogarty II].
While the Elzinga-Hogarty test has not been accepted in every instance by every court, the
test has been used widely by courts in determining geographic markets. See, e.g., United
States v. Rockford Memorial Corp., 717 F. Supp. 1251, 1266 (N.D. 111. 1989) (illustrating one
district court's treatment of the Elzinga-Hogarty test), afld, 898 F.2d 1278 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 498 U.S. 920 (1990).
116. Elzinga & Hogarty I, supra note 115, at 72. See also A.B.A. ANTITRUST SEC., Anti-
trust Law Developments 115-16 (2d ed. 1984).
117. Compare Northrop Corp. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 498 F. Supp. 1112, 1123
(C.D. Cal. 1980) (arguing the relevant product market was all aircraft and the relevant geo-
graphic market was the entire world, leading to quite a large relevant market) with Lorain
Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143, 146-47 (1951) (arguing the relevant product
market was the local newspaper and the relevant geographic market consisted of one small
town in Ohio leading to a rather small relevant market).
118. See NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. at 109.
119. Indiana Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. at 460-61.
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sary for making an informed choice was being withheld, and this
was a sufficient detrimental effect.12 0
Regardless of whether market power must be shown, courts
consider certain factors to determine whether the activity has un-
reasonably restrained trade. These factors include: (1) the nature
and character of the industry and the competitors in that indus-
try,1"' (2) competition in the industry-with and without the re-
straints in question,'22 (3) the nature or character of the restraints
and their actual or probable effects,' 23 (4) the history of the re-
straints,'" (5) the reasons for the particular practices alleged to be
unreasonable restraint, 125 and (5) whether the restraints are rea-
sonably necessary to achieve a legitimate business purpose.1
26
Courts are likely to engage in a balancing test, balancing the bad
effects of the restraint with legitimate business purposes.' 7 The
greater the bad effects and the less the reasonable necessity for
legitimate business purposes, the more likely a court will find an
antitrust violation has occurred.' 2
8
3. Intentionally Attempting to Maintain or Acquire a Monopoly
is Forbidden
Beyond per se offenses and Rule of Reason liability, the sec-
ond section of the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890129 makes it ille-
gal to "monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or con-
spire .. to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce."' 30 The
courts have split this portion of the Sherman Act into two types of
cases: monopolization' and attempted monopolization.'3 2 A busi-
ness commits a monopolization offense if it possesses monopoly
power as a result of its willfully acquiring or maintaining that
power or if the business uses monopoly power to prevent competi-
tion, gain a competitive advantage, or destroy a competitor.' 3 The
120. Id. at 463-64.
121. See NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. at 105 n.29
122. See id. at 106 n.30.
123. Id. at 107.
124. Id. at 115-16.
125. Id. at 113.
126. Id. at 114-15 (holding that the restraints did not enhance either production or
efficiency and thus had no legitimate business purpose).
127. Indiana Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. at 460-61.
128. NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. at 119-20.
129. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1988 & Supp. III 1992).
130. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1988 & Supp. III 1992).
131. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570 (1966).
132. A.A. Poultry, 881 F.2d at 1402.
133. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. at 570-71.
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simple possession of monopoly power or the existence of a business
as a monopoly is not in and of itself a violation of the antitrust
laws."" The monopolist must have also engaged in some sort of
anticompetitive conduct."'
It is necessary to define relevant geographic and product mar-
kets1 " in a monopolization case because an offender must have the
power unilaterally to affect competition, in a relevant market.3 '
While market share is a question of fact to be determined in every
case individually, fifty percent is typically not enough 8s while
eighty percent of the market will almost always be found to be
sufficient to create monopoly power. 39
Once the business is shown to have possessed monopoly power
in a relevant market, it must be shown that the business intended
to use that power to eliminate competition. 10 Businesses can man-
ifest this intent in virtually innumerable ways. Actions need not
even be actual restraints of trade in and of themselves to manifest
this intent to establish or to maintain monopoly power. 41 In
Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., the dominant
134. Id.
135. Id. If this were not the case, many small businesses in small towns in Montana
would be automatically in violation of the Sherman Act. In many small towns, the economy
will only bear one market participant in any particular product market. Additionally, many
small towns would be a relevant geographic market due to the great distances and sparse
population in Montana. For instance, many towns are served by only one ready-mix con-
crete company. Concrete, being very heavy and having a very short "shelf life," typically has
a very small geographic market and because concrete has not been freely interchanged with
another product, it has a very narrow product market description. Ready-mix will be used
as an example frequently in this Article because of its narrow relevant market descriptions.
See, e.g., Richter Concrete Corp. v. Hilltop Basic Resources, Inc., 547 F. Supp. 893 (S.D.
Ohio 1981), aff'd, 691 F.2d 818 (6th Cir. 1982). The antitrust laws would be foolish indeed if
they required two industry participants in a relevant market where the economy can only
support one. Either some sort of state supports would be necessary to prevent those two
market participants from disintegrating or many small towns would have no market
participants.
136. These markets are defined in precisely the same way as above. See supra notes
114-18 and accompanying text. In fact both Elzinga & Hogarty I and Elzinga & Hogarty II,
concerning geographic markets, were written with the Clayton Act in mind and have been
applied to all Sherman Act claims where geographic markets must be defined. See Grinnell
Corp., 384 U.S. at 572 (defining markets with respect to Sherman Act § 2 claims).
137. 3 JULIAN 0. VON KALINOWSKI, ANTITRUST LAWS AND TRADE REGULATION § 8.02[3]
(1993).
138. Domed Stadium Hotel, Inc. v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 732 F.2d 480, 489 (5th Cir.
1984) (stating that before a defendant can be found to be liable for monopolization, it must
have a market share of at least fifty percent). While this is dictum, it is indicative of most
courts' thoughts. See also Slocum Indus. Inc. v. Chelsea Indus., Inc., 1984-1 Trade Cas.
(CCH) T 65,932, at 68,028-29 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 17, 1984).
139. See United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 571 (1966).
140. United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 107 (1948).
141. Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 603-04 (1985).
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ski operator ceased its involvement in a long-standing marketing
arrangement where skiers could purchase a pass for use at multiple
areas.1 42 The Court found that the smaller ski area could not com-
pete. 43 Even though the act was not a restraint of trade in itself,
the intent was to create a monopoly,14 4 and consequently, liability
was found.145 Some intent to commit a wrongful act, however, must
always be found since the antitrust laws were not intended to pun-
ish competitors for competing fairly and successfully and attaining
size due to superior goods or services.'
Attempts to monopolize are also illegal under section two of
the Sherman Act.147 The elements of an attempt to monopolize
are: (1) the specific intent to monopolize a relevant market, 148 (2)
conduct that constitutes willful acquisition or maintenance of mo-
nopoly power if done by a true monopolist, 49 and (3) a "dangerous
probability of success.' 150 In most circuits, a finding of "a danger-
ous probability of success" can only be made after relevant geo-
graphic and product markets are defined and the alleged violator's
market share has been defined.1 5 ' In these circuits, the market
share necessary to support a finding of attempted monopolization
is typically less than the level required to support an actual mo-
nopolization case.1
52
The Ninth Circuit has been alone in not requiring a market
analysis in order to support a finding of "a dangerous probability
of success.' 53 The Ninth Circuit allows an inference of "a danger-
ous probability of success" to be drawn from a finding of specific
intent and anticompetitive conduct.1' Regardless of whether such
142. Id. at 589.
143. Id. at 594.
144. Id. at 610.
145. Id. at 611.
146. Id. at 600. See also United States v. Alcoa, 148 F.2d 416, 432 (2d Cir. 1945).
147. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1988 & Supp. III 1992).
148. A.A. Poultry Farms, Inc. v: Rose Acre Farms, Inc., 881 F.2d 1396, 1400-01 (7th
Cir. 1989).
149. TransAmerica Computer Co. v. International Business Mach. Corp., 698 F.2d
1377, 1382 (9th Cir. 1983) (providing an extensive discussion of this element).
150. Tasty Baking Co. v. Ralston Purina, Inc., 653 F. Supp. 1250, 1262 (E.D. Pa.
1987).
151. See, e.g., Shoppin' Bag of Pueblo, Inc. v. Dillon Cos., Inc., 783 F.2d 159, 161-62
(10th Cir. 1986). See also Deauville Corp. v. Federated Dep't Stores, 756 F.2d 1183, 1188
(5th Cir. 1985); National Reporting Co. v. Alderson Reporting Co., 763 F.2d 1020, 1025 (8th
Cir. 1985); White & White, Inc. v. American Hosp. Supply Corp., 723 F.2d 495, 507 (6th Cir.
1983); Nifty Foods Corp. v. Great Atlantic & Pac. Tea Co., 614 F.2d 832, 841 (2d Cir. 1980).
152. Tasty Baking, 653 F. Supp. at 1268.
153. William Inglis & Sons Baking Co. v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 668 F.2d 1014,
1029 n.11 (9th Cir. 1981).
154. Id. at 1029. This rule seems to be changing. A recent case relying upon William
[Vol. 54
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a showing is necessary, all three elements must be proved to have a
valid attempted monopolization case.
Beyond per se offenses, Rule of Reason cases, and monopoliza-
tion and attempt cases, most other antitrust law is built upon the
foundation laid by the Sherman Act. The practitioner should not
attempt to rely upon this article alone without reading the cases
cited and performing additional research. The Sherman Act, as
well as the other antitrust laws, are quite complex. For instance,
the interplay between economics and law' 55 requires great preci-
sion and care. Additionally, in the 100 years since the Sherman Act
was first enacted, the courts have created an immense body of law
covering virtually every type of activity imagined in business set-
tings. The cases discussed above with respect to the Sherman Act
and those presented below represent but a few of the types of cases
and doctrines that have developed. Careful research must precede
any work in the antitrust field and any advice given to businesses
concerning antitrust issues.16
B. The Clayton Act Primarily Addresses Mergers
The Sherman Act, from which per se offenses, Rule of Reason
cases, and attempted monopolization analysis developed, was sup-
plemented in 1914 by the enactment of the Clayton Act.' 7 Section
Inglis was reviewed by the United States Supreme Court. McQuillan v. Sorbothane, Inc.,
907 F.2d 154 (9th Cir. 1990), rev'd sub noma. Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 113 S. Ct.
884 (1992). The Court in Spectrum Sports held the plaintiff must perform a market analysis
to prevail in showing a dangerous probability of success. Id. at 892. While the unanimous
Court did not specifically overrule William Inglis, Spectrum Sports seems to bring the
Ninth Circuit in line with the other circuits in requiring both a product and geographic
market analysis prior to a finding of attempted monopoly. Id. However, it may be too soon
to predict how the Ninth Circuit will interpret Spectrum Sports. See also PLI Conference
Explores Ins and Outs of Federal Agencies' Antitrust Enforcement, 63 Antitrust & Trade
Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1591, at 615 (1992) (discussing the oral arguments in McQuillan on
Nov. 10, 1992).
155. The complex interplay is best illustrated by the case analysis and the economic
analysis that pervades Elzinga I especially. See Elzinga & Hogarty I, supra note 115, at 52-
72.
156. As one additional example of how specific and detailed the law has become, the
courts have developed what is known as the Intracorporate Conspiracy Doctrine concerning
whether one subsidiary of a corporation or a set of persons working within one business can
commit an antitrust violation in combination with another subsidiary or another group of
persons of that same corporation or business. See Oltz v. St. Peter's Community Hosp., 861
F.2d 1440 (9th Cir. 1988). For an overview of the many cases prior to Oltz that have ana-
lyzed this rather occult question see Milton Handler & Thomas A. Smart, The Present Sta-
tus of the Intracorporate Conspiracy Doctrine, 3 CARDOZO L. REv. 23, 26 (1981). In other
words, whatever the issue confronting the small business client, some court has probably
already considered it. The practitioner's challenge is to unearth the proper doctrine from
the 100 year history of antitrust law developments.
157. 38 Stat. 730 (1914) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1988)).
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Seven of the Clayton Act prohibits mergers and acquisitions where
"the effect of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen com-
petition or tend to create a monopoly. 1 58 The Clayton Act is pri-
marily concerned with mergers of competitors having antitrust re-
sults. 159 A relevant market must be established for a merger to
violate the antitrust laws. 60 The relevant market for Clayton Act
claims is defined in the same way as for Sherman Act claims. 6
Once the particular product and geographic markets are defined,
the merger violates the Clayton Act if a likely and substantial les-
sening of competition results from the merger.
62
Courts analyze four factors-market share, industry structure,
barriers to entry, and economies of scale-to determine whether
the merger has an anticompetitive effect. First, while not determi-
native, market share is quite important. 163 Second, the overall
structure of the industry is used to determine market concentra-
tion. Traditional antitrust law used the "four firm" ratio to deter-
mine industry structure, market share, and concentration.6 This
"four firm" ratio is the traditional method as also used in Sherman
Act claims.'65 An industry is considered highly concentrated where
four firms control seventy-five percent or more of the industry.'66
During the 1980s the Justice Department and various state at-
torneys general began to rely on a new method, the Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index, to gauge market concentration.'17 Unlike the
158. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1988).
159. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 333 (1962).
160. United States v. Rockford Memorial Corp., 898 F.2d 1278, 1283-84 (7th Cir.
1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 920 (1990).
161. See Elzinga & Hogarty I, supra note 115, at 73-74.
162. A recent case that provides an excellent explanation of the proof necessary in a
merger case is Rockford Memorial, 898 F.2d at 1283-86.
163. Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 328.
164. 2 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 13,103 (1984).
165. United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 331 (1963) (assuming
that four firm percentage is the proper inquiry).
166. 2 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 13,103 (1984).
167. ANTITRUST DIVISION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, MERGER GUIDELINES, 13-15, (June 14,
1984) [hereinafter 1984 MERGER GUIDELINES]; States Attorneys General, Merger Guidelines,
reprinted in Merger Guidelines, 50 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. Supp. (BNA) S-1 (1987).
The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index ("HHI") "is calculated by summing the squares of the
individual market shares of all the firms included in the market," 1984 MERGER GUIDELINES
at 13, once the relevant product and geographic markets have been defined. The question
becomes what is the relationship between the premerger HHI and the postmerger HHI.
"[I]f the increase in the HHI exceeds 100 and the post-merger HHI substantially exceeds
1800, only in extraordinary cases will such factors establish that the merger is not likely
substantially to lessen competition." Id. at 15. If one firm holding ten percent of the market
merges with another firm holding five percent of the market, an increase of 100 occurs. It is
very easy for the HHI to become quite a high number. For instance, "a market consisting of
four firms with market shares of 30 percent, 30 percent, 20 percent and 20 percent has an
[Vol. 54
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four firm ratio, the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index calculates the
level of concentration in an industry considering all market par-
ticipants, not only the largest four. 168
Third, courts consider "barriers to entry.1 69 The more easily
an incumbent can enter a new market, the less likely a Clayton Act
violation will be found. Finally, economies of scale or market effi-
ciencies are considered in viewing merger transactions.17 0 The Su-
preme Court has stated, however, that economies of scale by them-
selves are not a complete defense in merger actions.' As with the
Sherman Act, a great deal of research must be done prior to initi-
ating an antimerger lawsuit or advising a client as to the antitrust
implications of a potential merger acquisition.
Many acquisitions by Montana businesses may not directly
implicate the Clayton Act,172 nor would a Montana business likely
find itself a defendant in a Clayton Act action. As will be discussed
below in Part V, however, Montana businesses can use the Clayton
Act for protection against large national or multinational corpora-
HHI of 2600." Id. at 14 n.14. A market with only one participant, a pure monopoly, has an
HHI of 10,000. Id.
168. See Merger Guidelines, 50 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. Supp. (BNA) S-7 (1987).
The author believes that the HHI is no more useful than the older four firm ratio. The HHI
provides a number between one (in a market with a virtually unlimited number of partici-
pants such as summer lawn mowing youth) and 10,000. 1984 MERGER GUIDELINES, supra
note 167, at 14 n.14. The HHI can be simply inflammatory and confusing. For instance, if
one firm controls 70% of a market, the HHI will likely be at least 6,000 (70 squared plus the
squares of all the other percentages of market share). This HHI seems astronomical and is
already well above the 1,800 described by the Justice Department as being highly concen-
trated. Id. at 15. Whereas, if the other three largest businesses have only two or three per-
cent each, the four-firm ratio may be as low as 76%. A merger that increases the four firm
ratio from 76% to 77% will appear to be as insignificant as it is, while the same merger
considered under the HHI approach will look outrageous.
169. Ball Memorial Hosp., Inc. v. Mutual Hosp. Ins., Inc., 784 F.2d 1325, 1326 (7th
Cir. 1986) (describing the ease of entry analysis). See also United States v. Rockford Memo-
rial Corp., 898 F.2d 1278, 1285 (7th Cir. 1990).
170. See Rockford Memorial, 898 F.2d at 1283. See also Steve Stockum, The Efficien-
cies Defense for Horizontal Mergers: What is the Government's Standard, 61 ANTITRUST
L.J. 829, 840-47 (1993) (discussing a variety of mathematical models for defining market
efficiencies).
171. FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 580 (1967). A variety of other de-
fenses, issues, and factors exist that are sometimes considered in Clayton Act cases; how-
ever, these four are almost universally analyzed. For some of the other issues see, for exam-
ple, the failing firm defense in United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486, 506-
07 (1974).
172. The antitrust laws should not be forgotten, however, because, as many have
learned, antitrust enforcement can be initiated when enforcement is least expected. See,
e.g., FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 493 U.S. 411 (1990); FTC v. Indiana Fed'n
of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447 (1986) (two of the thousands of antitrust cases that surprised
defendants). Nonprofit corporations can also find themselves targets of federal antitrust en-
forcement. See Rockford Memorial, 898 F.2d 1278.
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tions seeking to acquire or compete with a small Montana
business.
C. The Sherman and Clayton Acts May Be Enforced by the
United States, the States, and Private Persons
A business may become the target of enforcement of the Sher-
man Act or the Clayton Act, as described above in Part II.A and B,
in a variety of ways. First, the federal government may bring an
action for civil penalties' 75 and, in merger cases, divestiture and
injunctive relief. 17 4 These actions may be brought either by the
Justice Department 175 or the Federal Trade Commission."'6 Addi-
tionally, the antitrust laws allow criminal enforcement against
businesses. A growing number of state attorneys general are
bringing actions against businesses for antitrust violations on be-
half of consumers. 178 In many cases, the attorneys general of sev-
eral states work together to seek enforcement." 9
Both the Sherman Act and Clayton Act also allow for private
enforcement.'80 An injured party"" may bring a private cause of
action against an antitrust offender for three times the actual dam-
ages incurred and may recover attorney fees, costs of suit, and pre-
judgment interest.'8 1 Private individuals, as well as the govern-
ment, may receive equitable remedies'83 in most cases.
D. Other Federal Laws Supplement the Sherman and Clayton
Acts
A variety of other federal laws may supplement the antitrust
laws or provide relief in specific cases. Before advising a client, the
173. 15 U.S.C. §§ 21(a), (b) (1988).
174. 15 U.S.C. § 21(b) (1988).
175. 15 U.S.C. § 9 (1988).
176. 15 U.S.C. § 21(a) (1988).
177. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1988). While criminal liability is beyond the scope of this Article,
with the increase in corporate criminal liability in the last few years, businesses should be
concerned about potential criminal liability.
178. See 15 U.S.C. § 15c (1988). See also Texas v. Scott & Fetzer Co., 709 F.2d 1024,
1026 (5th Cir. 1983) (demonstrating an interaction between state and federal law and the
bringing of an action by a state attorney general); Pennsylvania v. Mid-Atlantic Toyota
Distribs., Inc., 704 F.2d 125, 128 (4th Cir. 1983) (involving suits brought by attorneys gen-
eral of Maryland, Pennsylvania, and Delaware and counsel for the District of Columbia);
Tennessee v. Highland Memorial Cemetery, Inc., 489 F. Supp. 65, 68 (E.D. Tenn. 1980)
(Tennessee Attorney General sued cemeteries for violations of the Sherman Act).
179. See, e.g., New York v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 775 F. Supp. 676 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
180. 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (1988).
181. See infra notes 275-83 and accompanying text for a definition of "injured party."
182. 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (1988).
183. 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1988).
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practitioner should consider whether other applicable laws exist.
Some of the most frequently implicated federal laws particularly
applicable to small businesses address discriminatory pricing, agri-
cultural exemptions to antitrust laws, special rules applicable to
packers and stockyards, the role of the Federal Trade Commission,
and special notice requirements for large mergers. Each of these is
discussed in detail in this Section.
1. Sellers May Not Discriminate in Price Among Similar Buyers
The Robinson-Patman Anti-Discrimination Act,"" for in-
stance, was designed to prevent discriminatory pricing of the same
goods in interstate commerce without a valid reason.18 5 A business
may not either directly or indirectly discriminate in price between
different purchasers of similar goods in interstate commerce if that
discrimination lessens competition or tends to create a monop-
oly. ' The definition includes several important elements which
must be proved to maintain a successful Robinson-Patman ac-
tion.1 87 The first element is the charging of different prices for the
same goods by the same seller to different customers.1 88 The sec-
ond element is jurisdictional; the sales must occur in interstate
commerce.' 9 The final element considered by the courts is
whether a reasonable possibility exists that the discrimination in
price may harm competition. 9 " As may be expected, these ele-
ments are frequently complex. For instance, the same seller must
be involved in both sales.19' Much litigation has discussed whether
the goods sold in each sale are of "like grade and quality."'19 2
184. 15 U.S.C. §§ 13-13b, 21a (1988) (originally enacted as Act of June 19, 1936, ch.
592, 49 Stat. 1526).
185. Dean Milk Co. v. FTC, 395 F.2d 696, 701-02 (7th Cir. 1968).
186. See 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1988).
187. The same enforcement rules, including a private right of action and attorney fees,
apply to the Robinson-Patman Act as apply to the Sherman and Clayton Acts. See 15
U.S.C. § 15 (1988).
188. Ashkanazy v. I. Rokeach & Sons, Inc., 757 F. Supp. 1527, 1545-46 (N.D. Ill. 1991).
189. Misco, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 784 F.2d 198, 202 (6th Cir. 1986). How-
ever, such a requirement is not the virtually automatic and formalistic finding prevalent in
determinations of "in commerce" in Constitutional Commerce Clause cases. Compare the
Robinson-Patman "commerce" treatment in Misco,.784 F.2d at 202 with that in the Com-
merce Clause realm as detailed in Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S.
241, 258 (1964) and Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 124-25 (1942).
190. Ashkanazy, 757 F. Supp. at 1546.
191. See Acme Refrigeration of Baton Rouge, Inc. v. Whirlpool Corp., 785 F.2d 1240,
1243 (5th Cir. 1986) (finding that a parent corporation and a wholly owned subsidiary were
not the same seller for purposes of the Robinson-Patman Act).
192. DeLong Equip. Co. v. Washington Mills Abrasive Co., 887 F.2d 1499, 1517-18
(11th Cir. 1989) (finding sufficient identity between two physically identical products to sus-
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Finally, the United States Supreme Court has held that an an-
titrust injury must occur. 193 The mere fact of price discrimination
without this concomitant injury is not sufficient to justify liability
under this act.19 4 Also, unlike per se violations of the Sherman Act,
some defenses are available to the business charged with price dis-
crimination so that the mere act of discrimination need not always
lead to liability.'95
A business is well advised to be careful any time it provides
different prices for goods to different purchasers.' The Robinson-
Patman Act was designed generally to prevent large national busi-
nesses from gaining discriminatory preferences over small busi-
nesses due solely to the large businesses' greater purchasing
power. 197 Without providing similar benefits to the small pur-
chaser, these preferential prices could be devastating. 98 Consider-
ing the prevalence of small businesses in Montana, the Robinson-
Patman Act may be particularly helpful.
2. Many Agricultural Endeavors Are Exempt from Federal Anti-
trust Law
While the Robinson-Patman Act creates an additional, specific
area of antitrust enforcement, the Capper-Volstead Act'99 and Sec-
tion 6 of the Clayton Act 200 provide certain exemptions from the
reach of the antitrust laws for agricultural interests. Given the
large number of agricultural cooperatives in Montana, the Capper-
Volstead Act is particularly important. Provided that the agricul-
tural cooperative is organized for the mutual benefit of its mem-
bers, those members may make the necessary contracts and agree-
tain a Robinson-Patman claim, even though the products were labeled and branded differ-
ently), reh'g denied, 896 F.2d 560 (1990), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1081 (1990).
193. J. Truett Payne Co. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 451 U.S. 557, 562 (1981) (defining
an "antitrust injury" to mean the sort of injury to competition envisioned by the antitrust
laws as being an evil sufficient to justify treble damages and the other remedies in 15 U.S.C.
§ 15). "Antitrust injury" is defined similarly in standing cases under the Clayton and Sher-
man Acts. See, e.g., Atlantic Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328, 334 (1990).
194. Atlantic Richfield, 495 U.S. at 334.
195. See, e.g., Texaco Inc. v. Hasbrouck, 496 U.S. 543, 555-56 (1990) (discussing the
"functional discount" defense); Anderson Foreign Motors, Inc. v. New England Toyota Dis-
trib., Inc., 492 F. Supp. 1383, 1386-87 (D. Mass. 1980) (discussing the analysis of delivery
preferences that may justify variances in prices charged).
196. See, e.g., Anderson Foreign Motors, 492 F. Supp. at 1387 (illustrating that busi-
nesses need to use care in charging different prices to different purchasers).
197. Bouldis v. U.S. Suzuki Motor Corp., 711 F.2d 1319, 1326 (6th Cir. 1983).
198. Id.
199. 7 U.S.C. §§ 291-92 (1988) (originally enacted as an Act of February 18, 1922, ch.
57, §§ 1, 2, 42 Stat. 388).
200. 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1988).
248 [Vol. 54
24
Montana Law Review, Vol. 54 [1993], Iss. 2, Art. 2
https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr/vol54/iss2/2
SMALL BUSINESS ANTITRUST ISSUES
ments to affect common marketing. 0 1
The Capper-Volstead Act and section 6 of the Clayton Act,
however, do not provide absolute immunity to agricultural con-
cerns. '20 The Capper-Volstead Act itself gives the Secretary of Ag-
riculture the authority to issue cease-and-desist orders against ag-
ricultural cooperatives that monopolize or restrain trade to the
extent the price of the agricultural product is unduly enhanced. '0 3
Cooperatives that resort to coercive or predatory practices to in-
crease membership or to restrain competition through discrimina-
tory pricing are not exempt from the antitrust laws for those
acts.20 " Furthermore, agricultural associations and cooperatives
may not enter into agreements with persons not engaged in agri-
cultural production to acquire monopoly power.2 0 5 Finally, the
practitioner must be certain that the entity fits within the Capper-
Volstead Act's definition of "farmers agricultural associations" or
"cooperations." 0' If not, the entity may not qualify for exemption
under the Act.20 7 In fact, some associations that otherwise would
qualify for the exemption may be disqualified if unqualified per-
sons are members.
Provided that due care is taken, the Capper-Volstead Act and
Section 6 of the Clayton Act provide a great deal of freedom from
antitrust enforcement for Montana's agricultural community. For
example, an agricultural cooperative is permitted to fix prices, and
the cooperative can willfully obtain a monopoly through voluntary
enrollment of its members or through voluntary combination with
other cooperatives. 0 8
3. Special Laws Apply to Packers and Stockyards
Other agricultural interests are governed by the Packers and
Stockyards Act,2 09 which enhances the antitrust laws rather than
expanding exemptions. The Packers and Stockyards Act was en-
201. 7 U.S.C. § 291 (1988).
202. See Holly Sugar Corp. v. Gosen County Coop. Beet Growers Ass'n, 725 F.2d 564,
569 (10th Cir. 1984) (involving an agricultural cooperative that was not exempted from the
antitrust laws because it was engaging in picketing and harassment to coerce persons to join
its association and then to fix prices).
203. 7 U.S.C. § 292 (1988).
204. Alexander v. National Farmers Org., 687 F.2d 1173, 1182-83 (8th Cir. 1982).
205. Holly Sugar, 725 F.2d at 569.
206. 7 U.S.C. § 291 (1988).
207. See National Broiler Marketing Ass'n v. United States, 436 U.S. 816, 826-27
(1978).
208. Alexander, 687 F.2d at 1182.
209. 7 U.S.C. §§ 181-229 (1988) (originally enacted as Act of Aug. 15, 1921, ch. 64,
title I, 42 Stat. 159).
1993] 249
25
Blakely: Antitrust Issues for Lawyers Representing Small Businesses
Published by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law, 1993
MONTANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 54
acted because the executive branch of the federal government had
been unable to show a violation of any of the then existing anti-
trust laws by the five largest meat packers, even though the gov-
ernment believed the meat packers' activities should be prohib-
ited. 0 The Act enumerates several unlawful practices. 1 1 Persons
may not engage in unfair, unjustly discriminatory, or deceptive
practices;212 provide unreasonable preferences; 213 apportion supply
that tends to restrain commerce;2 1' control output or set prices to
create monopoly;215 or generally perform monopolistic behavior.2 16
The Packers and Stockyards Act has become little more than
a "weights and measures" act over the past 12 years.1 7 The Act,
however, should not be ignored by Montana cattle producers and
feedlots as a potential source of relief from the current Big Three
meat packers.21 8 Two major problems with the use of the Packers
and Stockyards Act are that courts have been reluctant to grant
attorney fees in private enforcement actions, 1 " and only single
damages are allowed, 2 whereas, under the Sherman and Clayton
210. 61 CONG. REC. 1601 (May 26, 1921) (statement of Rep. Haugen).
211. 7 U.S.C. § 192 (1988).
212. 7 U.S.C. § 192(a) (1988). See also Wilson & Co. v. Benson, 286 F.2d 891, 895 (7th
Cir. 1961).
213. 7 U.S.C. § 192(b) (1988).
214. 7 U.S.C. § 192(c) (1988).
215. 7 U.S.C. § 192(d) (1988).
216. 7 U.S.C. § 192(e) (1988). In essence, the Packers and Stockyards Act specifically
prohibits, with respect to meat packers and some others, the same sorts of activities which
are prohibited in the Sherman and Clayton Acts as to all businesses. Courts have held,
however, that the Packers and Stockyards Act is broader and more far reaching than the
Sherman Act due to the expansive legislative history. See Swift & Co. v. United States, 308
F.2d 849, 853 (7th Cir. 1962). For instance, the Packers and Stockyard Act does not require
the government to prove injury to competition. Swift & Co. v. United States, 393 F.2d 247,
253 (7th Cir. 1968).
217. Stephen Burke, Who Will Own the Cattle?, NAT'L CATTLEMAN, August 1988, at 5.
218. In 1988, Cargill Incorporated, ConAgra Incorporated, and IBP Incorporated con-
trolled over 70% of the beef packing industry nationwide. CENTER FOR RURAL AFFAIRS, COM-
PETITION AND THE LIVESTOCK MARKET (1990). While traditional antitrust laws have not been
particularly helpful, perhaps the Packers and Stockyards Act could be used successfully to
protect local ranchers and feedlot owners. Cf. In re Beef Indus. Antitrust Litig., 600 F.2d
1148 (5th Cir. 1979); In re Beef Indus. Antitrust Litig., 710 F.2d 216 (5th Cir. 1983); In re
Beef Indus. Antitrust Litig., 713 F. Supp. 971 (N.D. Tex. 1988) (holding in these related
cases that the Sherman and Clayton Acts alone would not allow the plaintiffs to prevail,
however, none of these cases involved the Packers and Stockyards Act, which might have
made a difference).
219. See Hays Livestock Comm'n Co. v. Maly Livestock Comm'n Co., 498 F.2d 925,
933 (10th Cir. 1974). This is very different from the liberal attorney fees available under the
Sherman and Clayton Acts. See 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1988); Hasbrouck v. Texaco, 631 F. Supp.
258, 268 (E.D. Wash. 1986).
220. 7 U.S.C. 4 209(a) (1988).
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Acts, treble damages and attorney fees are provided." '
4. A Special Federal Commission Oversees Antitrust En-
forcement
The Federal Trade Commission Act 22 provides an entity to
coordinate enforcement and interpretation of all the federal anti-
trust law.223 The Federal Trade Commission Act itself prohibits
unfair methods of competition in commerce and unfair or decep-
tive acts or practices,22 and empowers the Commission created by
the Act to prevent and seek redress for such actions.2 5 While the
Commission has published extensive regulations,""8 the actual level
of enforcement depends upon the members of the commission.2 7 A
more active commission will clearly seek greater enforcement of
the antitrust laws.
The Federal Trade Commission Act provides the final source
of enforcement. The Sherman and Clayton Acts allow the United
States Attorney General, ' 8 states' attorneys general,2 9 and private
individuals2 3 0 to enforce the antitrust laws. The Federal Trade
Commission Act created another entity with the power to en-
force.2"' Nevertheless, the Federal Trade Commission Act does not
create nor enhance a private cause of action. 32 Private individuals
must rely upon the traditional antitrust laws.2 33
5. Certain Mergers Trigger Greater Scrutiny
While an abundance of other federal acts and amendments
have some impact in the antitrust area,2 34 these Acts are not
treated in this article because most of the practices which they ad-
221. 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (1988).
222. Federal Trade Commission Act, Ch. 311, 38 Stat. 717 (1914) (codified at 15
U.S.C. §§ 41-71 (1988)).
223. See New Jersey Wood Finishing Co. v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 332 F.2d
346, 351 (3rd Cir. 1964), aff'd, 381 U.S. 311 (1965). See also 15 U.S.C. § 44 (1988).
224. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1988).
225. See 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2) (1988).
226. See generally 16 C.F.R. §§ 0.4 - 0.16 (1988).
227. See generally 15 U.S.C. § 41 (1988).
228. 15 U.S.C. § 9 (1988).
229. 15 U.S.C. § 15c (1988).
230. 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (1988).
231. 15 U.S.C. § 41 (1988).
232. Baum v. Great Western Cities, Inc., 703 F.2d 1197, 1209 (10th Cir. 1983).
233. See Carlson v. Coca-Cola Co., 483 F.2d 279, 281 (9th Cir. 1973).
234. See, e.g., McFadden Interlocking Directorates Act, Ch. 323, 38 stat. 732 (1914)
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 19 (1988)); Unfair Competition Act, Ch. 463, 39 stat. 798 (1916)
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 71 (1988)).
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dress are also addressed by other laws. The Hart-Scott-Rodino
Act,23 on the other hand, can have important implications for
some small businesses.236 The Hart-Scott-Rodino Act requires per-
sons who are preparing to acquire, either directly or indirectly, the
voting securities or assets of another "person" to notify the Federal
Trade Commission and the Assistant Attorney General for the An-
titrust Division of the Department of Justice of that intention in
cases of large mergers where the transactions are not specifically
exempted from the antitrust laws.23 7 Those mergers which require
this notification involve very large businesses. Most transactions
and mergers among small businesses would not require such pre-
merger notification; however, large mergers which do require such
notice may have a significant impact on a small business in the
same industry.
The Hart-Scott-Rodino Act can be useful, however, for Mon-
tana corporations who may be market participants in industries
dominated by multi-national corporations. In these cases, if huge
corporations seek to merge, they are required to file a pre-merger
notification.2 38 Following that filing, the Commission must publish
a notice concerning the proposed acquisition in the Federal Regis-
ter. 3 A waiting period then begins during which the merger may
not occur.24 ° During this waiting period a Montana business could
seek to prevent the merger, invoking the Clayton Act, or it could
use the waiting period to prepare for the aftermath of the merger.
III. A STATE'S ANTITRUST STATUTES MAY SUPPLEMENT THE
FEDERAL LAW
States had antitrust law before the federal laws were en-
acted.241 But since the enactment of the Sherman and Clayton
Acts, the federal law has had the greatest impact in antitrust.
However, recent state enforcement has seen a renewed enthusi-
235. Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act, Pub. L. 94-435, 90 Stat. 1383
(1976) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1 note 8, note 12, 15c-15g, 16, 18a, 26, 66, 1311-1344, 28
U.S.C. § 1407 (1988)).
236. The Hart-Scott-Rodino Act makes a variety of changes in the antitrust law, in-
cluding allowing states' attorneys general to bring suit. See 15 U.S.C. § 15c (1988). Never-
theless, the most important addition is the pre-merger notification requirement discussed in
this Article. 15 U.S.C. § 18a(a) (1988).
237. 15 U.S.C. § 18a(a) (1988).
238. 15 U.S.C. § 18a(a) (1988).
239. 15 U.S.C. § 18a(b)(2) (1988).
240. 15 U.S.C, § 18a(b)(1) (1988).
241. John Kincaid, Commentary: State Antitrust Law, 29 WASHBURN L.J. 188, 198
(Winter 1990).
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asm. 24 Many states' antitrust laws are modeled on the federal law
and share many commonalities. 4 3 Through the Antitrust Commit-
tee of the National Association of Attorneys General, the states
have achieved a great degree of consensus concerning antitrust en-
forcement. 2" Montana's Act is similar to other states' acts.
This section addresses Montana's Unfair Trade Practices and
Consumer Protection Act. ' 5 Montana's Act mirrors the Sherman
Act, Clayton Act, and Robinson-Patman Act. 4 6 In fact, the Mon-
tana Act directs courts to give "due consideration and weight" to
judicial interpretations of federal laws that are similar to the Mon-
tana Act.247
Even though the Montana Act provides for injunctions, treble
damages, attorney fees, and other remedies,2' 8 very little litigation
has been brought under the law. The Montana Act should not be
discounted, however, because some practices which may be difficult
to prove under federal law may be more clearly defined under the
Montana Act.
Predatory pricing, the practice of pricing goods at such a low
cost as to drive a competitor from business, is very difficult to
prove under the federal law. 4" However, the Montana law simply
forbids sales at less than the cost of the item for the purpose of
injuring competitors and destroying competition.2 50 Furthermore,
interstate commerce is not necessary to trigger a state action claim.
Injunctions and treble damages are available under the Mon-
tana Act, as in the federal antitrust laws.21 Additionally, business
directors, officers, and agents who, directly or indirectly, assist or
aid the violation of the Montana Act are responsible equally with
242. Id. at 188.
243. See generally Robert Abrams, Antitrust Enforcement in the 1990s, 29 WASHBURN
L.J. 350 (Winter 1990).
244. Id. at 353.
245. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 30-14-101 to -224 (1991).
246. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-14-205 (1991).
247. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-14-104 (1991). To see how one federal court used fed-
eral case law to interpret a state's antitrust laws see Assam Drug Co. v. Miller Brewing Co.,
798 F.2d 311, 313 (8th Cir. 1986) (applying South Dakota law by using federal case law
interpretations of federal antitrust law).
248. MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-14-222 (1991).
249. For instance, under federal interpretations, the business may be allowed to sell
below cost without a finding of illegality. See MCI Communications Corp. v. American Tel.
& Tel. Co., 708 F.2d 1081,1114 (7th Cir. 1983). The Seventh Circuit has even added a
requirement that the plaintiff must be able to show that the price cutting monopolist would
be able to recover later any losses he suffered during the predatory pricing. See AA Poultry
Farms v. Rose Acre Farms, 881 F.2d 1396, 1400 (7th Cir. 1989).
250. MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-14-209 (1991).
251. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 30-14-222(1), (2) (1991).
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the business for whom the person acts.2 52 The Montana Act, which
uses more precise language than the federal laws because it was
written in light of federal developments, could become quite well
used. 53
In a related field, the Montana legislature in the 1991 session
enacted the Montana Retail Motor Fuel Marketing Act.254 This
temporary law, which is in effect only until July 1, 1993, was
designed to protect independent, small dealers and distributors
from below cost pricing by large national corporations.2 55 No cases
have been reported under this Act but its enactment does tend to
show that the Montana legislature is concerned about antitrust is-
sues and protecting Montana businesses.
Furthermore, the Montana Legislature passed Senate Bill 190
in the 1991 legislature. 256 This bill, which was vetoed by Governor
Stephens,257 was an Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois repealer.5 8 Should
such a bill be enacted by a future legislature, the Montana state
antitrust law could be used to fill the gap created in federal law by
Illinois Brick.259
IV. POTENTIAL LIABILITY OF SMALL BUSINESSES
Large multinational corporations, such as the Bell Telephone
system, are not the only targets of antitrust enforcement.26 0 Small
businesses must be aware of potential liability as well.26 This Part
uses the characteristics of the Montana business community for
examples of potential antitrust liability. As more and more na-
tional businesses enter Montana and as Montana businesses enter
252. MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-14-203 (1991).
253. The Montana Act is probably better written than the federal antitrust law be-
cause the Montana Act was written significantly later than the federal law and benefits from
the years of refinement to the federal law. Those points that were honed over time by the
federal courts were incorporated into the Montana law.
254. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 30-14-801 to -806 (1991).
255. MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-14-802 (1991).
256. S.B. 190, 52d Mont. Leg. (1991).
257. Veto Message of Gov. Stan Stephens, April 8, 1991, 2 S. Journal 1391, 52d Mont.
Leg. (1991) [hereinafter Veto Message].
258. Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977) (holding that only those persons
dealing directly with a monopolist have standing to sue that monopolist in federal antitrust
law). See infra notes 274-81 and accompanying text.
259. See discussion infra at note 277 concerning Illinois Brick repealers elsewhere.
260. United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982), aff'd
sub nom. Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983). This national case involving the
break up of Bell was originally filed in 1949. While many antitrust cases consume a great
amount of time, this is unusually long. The break up of Bell and its impact on virtually
every American household probably accounts for the public's awareness of antitrust.
261. See infra notes 305-09 and accompanying text.
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national markets, practitioners must be able to advise those small
businesses concerning antitrust matters. 2 ' This Part uses exam-
ples to illustrate some of the most common small business viola-
tions. Finally, a discussion of enforcement against small businesses
provides the practitioner with information necessary to encourage
small businesses to address potential problem areas.
A. Small Businesses Have Attributes that Increase Some
Antitrust Risks
Due to the geographic size and sparse population of Montana,
a great number of small businesses have monopolies.6 s Consider as
an example of monopolies264 in Montana, ready-mix concrete
sales.265 Many small towns in Montana cannot support but one
ready-mix concrete company. Consequently, the fact that only one
market participant exists does not indicate the participant is bad
or in any other way attempting to exploit the market in violation
of antitrust laws. 6
The simple possession of monopoly power by a business by it-
self does not constitute an antitrust violation.267 For such a viola-
tion to occur, that business must have obtained or maintained that
monopoly power through anticompetitive means.6 8 Monopolies do
occur without bad acts. The antitrust laws are not in place to force
businesses out of business simply because a monopoly happens to
exist or to force two competitors to share a product and geographic
262. See discussion of the global economy and state antitrust issues in Kincaid, supra
note 241, at 194-97.
263. Four types of situations are frequently described generically as "monopoly." A
monopoly is the exclusive possession of the market position for manufacture or sale of a
particular product as the seller, WEBSTER'S SEVENTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 548 (3d
ed. 1969). Monopsony is the exclusive possession of the market position as a buyer of a
particular product. Id. at 549. Oligopoly is the non-exclusive yet limited participation in the
sale of a particular product by a few competitors. Id. at 588. Oligopsony is the non-exclusive
possession of buying position by a few powerful market participants. Id.. Typically, for pur-
poses of antitrust law, "monopoly" is used as a generic to include any or all of these. How-
ever, in the example to be used in this section, the participants in the particular product
market have an actual, technical monopoly in their geographic markets.
264. "Monopoly" is not used as a pejorative in all situations but rather is merely a
descriptive term.
265. Ready-mix concrete is defined by the courts as a product market. The geographic
market for ready-mix is extremely small due to its limited "shelf life." See Richter Concrete
Corp. v. Hilltop Basin Resources, Inc., 547 F. Supp. 893, 902 (S.D. Ohio 1981).
266. Havre Ready-Mix Concrete Company in Havre, Lunda Redi-Mix, Inc. in Cut
Bank, and R&H Concrete in Columbus are examples of a few places in Montana with only
one ready-mix company. Even a city the size of Missoula has only three ready-mix concrete
companies.
267. United States v. Grinnell, 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966).
268. Id.
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market that cannot bear but one such business. If the business's
monopoly power was gained or maintained through competition
"on the merits,"26 9 no violation of the antitrust laws occurs.27 Con-
sequently, the simple fact of the existence of a monopoly in ready-
mix in a small town such as Havre, Montana or the existence of an
oligopoly in ready-mix in a city such as Missoula, Montana does
not, in itself, lead to the conclusion that an antitrust violation has
occurred.27 ' However, the existence of such a monopoly should lead
the Montana business to exercise caution. The narrow lines be-
tween anticompetitive conduct and competition on the merits,27 2
and between free and fair competition in pricing and predatory
pricing designed to maintain a monopoly,2 73 demand careful atten-
tion when a new entrant appears in the market and when the busi-
ness environment changes.
1. Small Businesses May be Trapped Between Monopolists and
Consumers
The United States Supreme Court in Illinois Brick held that
the only private individuals who could maintain antitrust lawsuits
based on federal law are those persons who deal directly with the
monopolist.274 Others, such as those who purchase from a whole-
saler who, in turn, purchased from a monopolist are precluded
from bringing antitrust actions based on federal law.276
The Illinois Brick repealer for Montana passed in the 1991
legislature,2 76 but was vetoed by Governor Stan Stephens ostensi-
bly because it would have a chilling impact on national businesses
269. The line between competition on the merits and anticompetitive conduct is some-
times not easily drawn. See TransAmerica Computer Co. v. International Business Mach.
Corp., 698 F.2d 1377, 1384 (1983).
270. Olympia Equip. Leasing Co. v. Western Union Tel., 797 F.2d 370, 375 (7th Cir.
1986).
271. Id.
272. See TransAmerica Computer, 698 F.2d at 1384.
273. See Northeastern Tel. Co. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 651 F.2d 76, 87 (2d Cir.
1981).
274. Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 745-46 (1977).
275. In Illinois Brick, the State of Illinois and several Illinois cities brought an action
against the brick company based on the Clayton Act. They said Illinois Brick's monopolistic
practices caused an increase in the price that contractors purchasing concrete blocks were
charged. The contractors then used the blocks in buildings constructed for the state and
municipalities. The important issue was that the contractors themselves did not sue the
company. Illinois Brick remains the applicable law in federal antitrust cases except that
lawsuits by individual consumers seem to be immune from the Illinois Brick problem. See
Blue Shield of Virginia v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 474-75 (1982); Reiter v. Sontone Corp.,
442 U.S. 330, 337 (1979).
276. S.B. 190, 52d Mont. Leg. (1991).
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doing business in Montana. 7' This repealer would have allowed
persons to reach past the person selling the goods and strike at the
monopolist.
While this may not seem important at first glance, frequently
businesses are caught between monopolists whom the small busi-
ness cannot afford to irritate by challenging its practices and an
indirect purchaser who has no standing.17 8 Montana retailers were
caught between Nintendo and consumers recently.17  Those retail-
ers had good reason not to bring an antitrust action against
Nintendo when Nintendo was engaged in price fixing because they
feared Nintendo would retaliate and because Nintendo products
were so popular. Consumers were forced to wait until the states'
attorneys general brought suit against Nintendo in their name. 80
Montana's Attorney General joined the suit on behalf of Montana
consumers.' Had an Illinois Brick repealer been in place, con-
sumers or others negatively impacted by Nintendo's antitrust vio-
lations could have sought redress even though they were not in di-
rect contact with Nintendo.
277. See Veto Message, supra note 257. The author drafted that Illinois Brick re-
pealer to help Montana businesses and consumers because states that have the strongest
Illinois Brick repealers and consumer protection laws seem to do best with business growth.
Sixteen states enacted Illinois Brick repealers by August, 1990. See ABA Revises Code of
Judicial Conduct, Urges Congress to Study Dual Enforcement, 59 Antitrust Trade Reg.
Rep. (BNA) No. 1479, at 257 (1990). The National Association of Attorneys General has
advocated such repealers for a long time. NAAG and Federal Agencies Accentuate Positives
in Antitrust, Consumer Issues, 57 Antitrust Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1446, at 854
(1989). Additionally, the United States Supreme Court has held that state Illinois Brick
repealers are not preempted by federal law. California v. ARC America Corp., 490 U.S. 93,
105-06 (1989).
278. In Illinois Brick, the contractors who bought from the brick company did not
bring the action. They were most likely concerned that if they brought suit against their
brick supplier, that supplier would delay their shipments, refuse to extend them credit, or a
variety of other acts that might annoy them or hurt their business but which could not be
shown to be retaliatory. See Illinois Brick, 431 U.S. at 746. Not many businesses can afford
to irritate their suppliers, especially if their suppliers are monopolists. These difficulties
seem to be much more significant than the problem the courts will have in apportioning
damages, the principle reason that Justice White used to support the holding in Illinois
Brick. See id. at 715.
279. See New York v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 775 F. Supp. 676 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). With
the popularity of Nintendo products, a retailer could not afford to alienate Nintendo and
take a chance of its customers defecting to retailers who could stock an entire line of
Nintendo products because Nintendo might decide to delay or reduce shipments to the
plaintiff retailer.
280. Id.
281. Id.
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2. Sometimes Small Business Entrepreneurial Spirit May Cause
Problems
Not only may small businesses be walled in the middle by Illi-
nois Brick, so that they may not be willing to alienate their suppli-
ers to protect consumers, the businesses traditionally have not
thought of antitrust in the day-to-day dilemma of keeping their
businesses afloat. However, this entrepreneurial spirit can lead to
potential antitrust problems.
Return to the example of the ready-mix industry. Suppose
that in one of Montana's towns, which has only had one ready-mix
company, another business seeks to sell ready-mix. 282 The second
company can only quarry enough stone for its own needs, however,
and cannot sell crushed rock to its customers. To attempt to main-
tain its strong position, the first ready-mix company, which quar-
ries sufficient quantities of stone to sell crushed rock as well as
ready-mix, tells its customers that it will only sell crushed rock to
those who also buy its ready-mix.
This could be a tying violation.283 Even if the first company
were to tell its customers that they would receive a discount, either
on ready-mix or on crushed rock, if both products are bought from
them, a Robinson-Patman Act violation may occur.2 18 These are
the types of practices that are likely to develop when a small Mon-
tana entrepreneur attempts to stay in business and maximize mar-
ket share.
B. Four Temptations of Small Businesses That Could Trigger
Liability
Small business owners and managers spend most of their time
and energy keeping their businesses operating. The exigencies of
conducting a small business occupy such a vast amount of time
that few owners and managers can consider antitrust implications
of their actions. Four practices in particular can cause antitrust
problems to businesses that are not careful. First, small business
owners in similar fields tend to talk to each other. If their conver-
sations result in price fixing, an antitrust violation may occur. Sec-
ond, to encourage customers to use all of the businesses products
282. As with all of the examples used, this example is fictitious but is built upon the
author's experience in a different industry.
283. Southern Concrete Co. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 F. Supp. 362 (N.D. Ga.
1975), alf'd, 535 F.2d 313 (5th Cir. 1976).
284. See DeLong Equip. Co. v. Washington Mills Abrasive Co., 887 F.2d 1499, 1517
(11th Cir. 1989). If interstate commerce is not implicated, then Montana's law declaring
preferential pricing illegal might apply. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-14-205 (1991).
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or services, a business may commit a tying violation. Third, busi-
nesses may illegally allocate markets in an effort to maximize effec-
tiveness or to work together with their peers. Finally, growth
through mergers can sometimes trigger scrutiny and the discovery
of antitrust liability. Each of these areas is explored in this section
by the use of examples.285
1. Price Fixing
Suppose that there are two automobile repair businesses in
Smalltown, Montana, Low Fixit and High Fixit. The owners likely
know each other. For example, Mrs. S. Mith brings her car to High
Fixit for a tuneup. She is told the price will be $50. She responds
truthfully by saying that Low Fixit only charges $45. If High Fixit
only charges her $45 now, it is merely conscious parallelism and no
antitrust violation occurs.2"'
However, suppose Mr. High, the owner of High Fixit, phones
Mr. Low that evening and says "Mrs. Mith came in today and told
me you only charge $45 for a tuneup. It costs me $40 to do a
tuneup and I want to make $10 profit so we need to charge $50." If
Mr. Low does anything except continue to charge $45, he is poten-
tially committing an antitrust violation. 87 Mr. Low need not spe-
cifically state "yes, I agree to charge $50," his actions can show his
agreement. 88 Of course, Mr. High may have committed an anti-
trust violation based on the Rule of Reason analysis simply by ask-
ing that the prices be fixed.28 9
2. Tying
Tying need not be as obvious or extreme as the example from
the ready-mix industry given above. Often, tying in Montana is
much more subtle. Many consumers and businesses in Montana
have purchased personal computers in the last few years. Some
people save money by buying their computers from large national
mail order companies. Because those companies purchase those
285. Each of the examples is analyzed with respect to federal antitrust law, and fed-
eral cases applying that law are used. The reader may wish to consider the appropriate state
law in each circumstance as well to supplement the federal law.
286. See generally E.I. du Pont De Nemours & Co. v. FTC, 729 F.2d 128 (2d Cir.
1984).
287. See id. at 139.
288. See id.
289. See Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 344 (9th Cir. 1982).
This kind of behavior is not exclusively confined to the auto repair business. An example
could be drawn from virtually every business and industry in Montana, including the prac-
tice of law.
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computers in large quantities and can resell them much less expen-
sively than a local Montana computer business, they can charge
less than the local computer store.
Suppose that a Montana business, Harry's Hats, bought a
computer from a national mail order company and new software
from a local computer store. Later, when Harry has difficulty using
the software, he asks the store for help. The store owner is not very
helpful. As Harry leaves the store, the owner turns to another busi-
nessman, Ed, who has just listened to the interchange. The owner
says, "if Harry had bought his computer from us, we would have
helped him more with the software he bought from us."
Ed decides to buy his computer from the local store and buys
software identical to that bought by Harry. The computer store
owner goes to Ed's business and gives him extensive assistance
with the software. Later when Ed is having the same problem that
Harry had, the owner spends hours training Ed. This may be an
illegal tying.' 90 Even if the computer store owner can show that he
charged a higher price for the computer he sold to include subse-
quent service on installing subsequently purchased software or as
part of a package, he could face significant costs of defense.'
However, if Harry paid the same price for software as Ed yet re-
ceived different service, and Ed knew about this, Ed may not have
bought the computer from the computer store had it not been tied
to subsequent software service.292
3. Market Allocations
The geographic size of Montana and the locations of popula-
tion and economic centers may make market allocations attractive.
Consider two grocery wholesalers in the same Montana population
center, Wesell Grocers and Webuy Grocers. Within that population
center, it is likely that both wholesalers will attempt to sell their
products to all grocery retailers. The distances from that large city
to smaller cities, or towns, may be so great that the wholesaler may
not wish to attempt to service every small town between its popu-
lation center and the distribution zone of the next population
290. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 305 (1949).
291. See Times-Picayune Pub. Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 597-602 (1953) (de-
tailing the extensive procedural history of this case in which the original defendant finally
prevailed).
292. See generally Southern Concrete Co. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 F. Supp.
362 (N.D. Ga. 1975), aff'd, 535 F.2d 313 (5th Cir. 1976) (involving a purchase of concrete
tied to accepting loans, showing that, as in the software and computer example, the tied
product and the tying product need not be similar products and, in fact, need not be "prod-
ucts" at all but can be services, commercial paper, or any combination).
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center. If Wesell and Webuy agree that Wesell will sell to the re-
tailers in the geographic territory to the north and west of the city,
and Webuy will sell to the stores in the geographic territory to the
east and south of the city, an illegal market allocation may have
occurred. 93
This illegal market allocation may even have been economi-
cally necessitated by the great geographic distances and the num-
bers of days of the week when each of the wholesalers has a deliv-
ery truck available for out-of-town deliveries.2 94 However, if there
is an agreement to allocate the geographic markets in this way,
there is an illegal market allocation.
2 95
Product markets can also be allocated illegally. For instance,
Wesell and Webuy may decide that they both can survive in the
industry while supplying the typical grocery goods-canned vege-
tables, produce, and the like-but only room in the market exists
for one market participant in candy and one market participant in
cosmetic products. If the two competitors agree that one will han-
dle cosmetic products and not candy, and the other will handle
candy and not cosmetic products, an illegal product market alloca-
tion may have occurred. 96
4. Mergers
Sooner or later, virtually every successful Montana business
will either get to the point that it wishes to expand by entering a
new geographic or product market or, if it has been very successful,
will find itself the target of another company's expansion. Merging
with another company is perhaps the easiest way to expand. For
the purposes of the Clayton Act, a merger need not be defined as
narrowly as the purchase of every asset of another business. 9 7 A
merger may be the purchase of a business's stock, 8 the purchase
of a business's name and customers even though someone else
purchases the inventory, or other activities of a similar nature. 299
Because many industries in Montana within geographic mar-
kets are either monopolies or oligopolies, it is quite common for a
293. See United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 612 (1972) (involving grocers
who decided who would be licensed geographically and thereby allocating the market).
294. Id.
295. Id.
296. See id. at 605.
297. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1988).
298. United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 335-36 (1963).
299. See United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586, 588, 607
(1957) (purchase of 23% of General Motors' stock by du Pont constituting a Clayton Act
violation).
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merger to create a monopoly. Suppose that a health food store in a
Montana city, Healthy Hal's, has a significant number of custom-
ers who drive about fifty miles occasionally to go to that store be-
cause the only health food store in the smaller city in which they
live, Frank's Foods, does not provide as satisfactory a level of
products and services. The customers tell Hal that if they had a
store like Hal's in their small city, they would purchase from that
store much more frequently but, as it is, they do not use Frank's at
all and only travel to Hal's infrequently.
Rather than attempting to open a new health food store in the
small city, Hal buys Frank's, changes its name, and provides the
same products and services as Hal provides in the larger city. A
Clayton Act merger violation may have occurred.300 The geographic
market may be defined to include both of these cities because cus-
tomers traveled frequently enough across the territory. 0 1 If the ge-
ographic market is defined more narrowly to include only each
store's city, the merger still creates a monopoly in one market. Ei-
ther way, the Clayton Act may be implicated. 02
C. Enforcement Against Small Businesses Is Becoming a
Growing Concern
Given the number of potential antitrust violations committed
by small businesses, for example in a state with the demography
and geography of Montana, why has there been such sparse anti-
trust enforcement here? The two principal reasons for lack of en-
forcement, either by the government or by individuals, are lack of
awareness and lack of motivation. Even though antitrust injuries
are real and prevalent, many times the injured person is unaware
that with better competition, the economic injury would not occur.
Alternatively, some businesses would rather suffer an antitrust in-
jury as a cost of doing business than attempt to redress the injury
and chance raising the ire of a huge corporation.
First, many individuals are unaware of antitrust violations
when they occur. For instance, in the auto repair price-fixing ex-
ample, Mrs. S. Mith, or whoever goes to have a tune-up next and
pays $50, will probably be unaware that High and Low have com-
bined to fix the price at $50 for this particular service. But even if
they are aware of the factual circumstance which would lead to
300. See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 333 (1962).
301. See FTC v. Elders Grain, Inc., 868 F.2d 901, 902 (7th Cir. 1989) (monopoly cre-
ated from an oligopoly).
302. Id. Assume that the volume of business and the values of the businesses are not
enough to implicate the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act. See supra text accompanying notes 234-40.
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antitrust liability, they probably are not aware of the legal ramifi-
cations of the action. In the computer software example, the cus-
tomer may be aware that he purchased his computer s3 because
that purchase was tied to a product that he wanted, namely the
computer software and service combination, 04 but he may not be
aware that it is potentially an antitrust violation. The customer
also may not know enough to care.
Second, the scale on which Montana businesses may commit
antitrust violations has been quite small compared to some of the
national cases. For instance, market allocations by the grocery
wholesalers may only cost the small grocery store in the small town
a few pennies over the price it would pay in a truly competitive
market. This price may or may not be passed on to the customers,
who are already probably paying higher prices given the fewer
market participants in the retail grocery market in their small
town. Therefore, so long as the potential antitrust violations are
committed locally, the awareness and motivation probably lead to
a lack of enforcement.
However, the increasing global economy may lead to more ex-
tensive enforcement.30 5 For instance, when a national grocery dis-
tribution company courts the small Montana grocery store that has
been served exclusively by the allocated local grocery wholesaler,
the small grocery owner in the small town may become aware of
the antitrust violation under which he has been suffering for many
years. A small grocer made aware of his remedies may choose to
seek damages for several years on several product lines against a
local wholesaler, if the grocer can purchase from a national whole-
saler without fear of retaliation.30 6
Many Montana businesses are attempting to expand into na-
tional markets. In doing so, the local business may be tempted to
continue to engage in practices that are illegal but for which it has
never been held accountable. For instance, suppose a local manu-
facturer of herbal tea has always sold that tea through small, inde-
pendent grocery stores in Montana."' The manufacturer wishes to
compete with the national premium herbal tea brands and so en-
gages in practices that could be described as vertical resale price
maintenance by trying to force its local grocers to charge high
303. The tied product.
304. The tying product.
305. See Kincaid, supra note 241, at 194-97.
306. See, e.g., Martin B. Glauser Dodge Co. v. Chrysler Corp., 570 F.2d 72, 74 (3d Cir.
1977) (involving a small auto dealer who brought suit against Chrysler Corporation).
307. Herbal tea may or may not be a relevant product market. See R.C. Bigelow, Inc.
v. Unilever N.V., 867 F.2d 102 (2d Cir. 1989).
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prices and, therefore, make its tea appear exclusive. The manufac-
turer responds to complaints by independent grocers that other in-
dependent grocers are selling the tea at a discount by first threat-
ening to refuse to deal with the discounters, and then by actually
refusing to deal. The manufacturer then tells the complainers that
they should feel vindicated." 8
As the tea manufacturer's fame grows, a large national, dis-
count grocer seeks to purchase the tea. That grocer maintains
chain stores in Montana and wishes to use this tea as a discounted
version of the national herbal tea brand. When the manufacturer is
told that the national grocer is discounting the manufacturer's tea,
the manufacturer may likely respond as it has been responding to
the local independent grocers. If so, the odds are great that the
national chain will enforce resale price maintenance law against
the manufacturer.0 9
This discussion should not lead the practitioner to conclude
that Montana businesses have no recourse against national busi-
nesses or that' Montana businesses must cease seeking the same
results. In many instances, a small business may need to change its
methods to avoid antitrust liability, but it may still achieve the
same results. As an example, the tea manufacturer need only fol-
low the dictates of Monsanto.310 First the manufacturer must make
its employees aware of the sorts of statements that they may not
make. A local sales representative may not say to the national bus-
iness, "we have received many complaints from other grocers of
your discounting and we are going to discontinue selling to you.' "
According to Monsanto, the manufacturer may refuse to sell to
anyone at any time for no reason, or for any lawful reason.' Con-
sequently, the manufacturer need only say that the manufacturer
has unilaterally decided that it will not sell to this grocer.3 13
Small businesses need not be afraid of antitrust enforcement
against them. An awareness of the four most prevalent types of
antitrust violations involving small businesses can keep those busi-
nesses safe. Additionally, the creative small business lawyer can as-
308. This would even be illegal under Monsanto. See Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite
Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 768 (1984).
309. See Socony-Vacuum v. Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 225-27 (1940).
310. See Monsanto, 465 U.S. at 761.
311. See id. at 768.
312. Id. at 766.
313. Id. at 763. Of course, this does not take into account the potential loss of business
and loss of name recognition. The manufacturer may do well to realize that, while its pride
of place may be bruised, it may do quite well as the lower priced alternative to the other
national brand and could become quite happy as the second national brand.
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sist small businesses in achieving positive business results without
creating antitrust liability.
V. USING ANTITRUST LAWS TO BENEFIT A SMALL BUSINESS
The creative small business lawyer can also employ antitrust
law as an offensive weapon to the benefit of small businesses. Ac-
tive use of antitrust law does not mean that the small business
must move immediately toward litigation on its own behalf against
an antitrust violator. One of the many available options is negoti-
ating with the alleged offender with an eye towards the potential-
ity of litigation.3 14
Perhaps a more economical option is to seek enforcement
against the violator,"1 ' or investigation of the violator by a federal
agency such as the Federal Trade Commission.316 The following
two examples show how each of these alternatives, negotiating with
a potential violator and seeking United States' enforcement, are
used to the benefit of the small Montana business.3
A. Antitrust Laws Help Small Businesses Enter Markets
Dominated by Monopolists
A monopolist has a clear and definite advantage over a busi-
ness that wishes to enter a particular product or geographic mar-
ket. 1 8 The established monopolist probably has a great deal of
customer loyalty, name recognition, community ties, and capital
with which to keep the potential entrant off balance. 319 The poten-
tial entrant, on the other hand, has a difficult task even on a level
playing field. The antitrust laws provide some relief for the poten-
tial market entrant, so that it need not sit blithely by should the
monopolist attempt to continue its monopoly by foreclosing the
market to that potential entrant.
Suppose that in a small Montana city supporting one ready-
mix concrete company (C&W Supply), Mr. E decides to open a
second ready-mix concrete company. The only site for Mr. E's
ready-mix plant, properly located in the geographic market and
314. Typically, litigation is brought under 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1988) or MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 30-14-222 (1991).
315. See 15 U.S.C. § 21 (1988). (The United States government bears most of the cost
of enforcement or investigation.).
316. See 15 U.S.C. § 46 (1988).
317. These examples are drawn from the author's experience but the identity of the
industry in each case has been changed.
318. See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 333 (1962).
319. United States v. Rockford Memorial Corp., 898 F.2d 1278, 1283-84 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 111 S.Ct. 295 (1990).
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meeting necessary specifications, however, has no water. C&W is
the only seller of water in the geographic water market. Mr. E can
acquire all other necessary ingredients for his concrete except
water.2 ° Mr. E, uncharacteristically, visits his attorney prior to
making his final decision on whether to enter the ready-mix
business.
From a business standpoint, Mr. E has two problems. First, he
must determine whether he can acquire a necessary ingredient,
water, to actually produce ready-mix concrete. Second, Mr. E must
determine whether he can stay in business against a pre-existing
monopolist.
Mr. E's first problem is easy to resolve in his favor. C&W must
sell water to Mr. E at the same price that it charges other indus-
trial purchasers.32 1 Two antitrust doctrines provide this relief for
Mr. E. The Essential Facility Doctrine 322 states that a monopolist
may not utilize its control over an "essential facility" to foreclose
competitors.2 3 A "facility" need not be a physical place but can be
anything that is essential for the competitor.3 2
4
Mr. E must establish four things to prevail against C&W
should C&W refuse to sell him water.3 25 First, Mr. E must estab-
lish that C&W has control over the essential facility, the water.326
Second, Mr. E must show he is a competitor and is practically in-
capable of duplicating water access because water is not available
elsewhere in the same relevant water market.32 7 Third, Mr. E must
establish that C&W refused to allow him to purchase the water.2 8
Finally, Mr. E must show that C&W had sufficient water to sell to
Mr. E. 29 If C&W routinely sells water, Mr. E should be able to
prove the existence of sufficient water.
The Ninth Circuit has interpreted the Essential Facility Doc-
trine in such a way that the competitor seeking use of the monopo-
320. Assume that Mr. E performs significant market research and determines that on
a level field with C&W he can enter the market and survive.
321. See Fishman v. Estate of Wirtz, 807 F.2d 520, 540 (7th Cir. 1986).
322. Id. at 539.
323. Id.
324. Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 377 (1973) (holding that the
essential facility was electricity). See also Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing
Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 600-01 (1985) (reviewing the court of appeals' discussion that advertis-
ing could be an essential facility).
325. MCI Communications Corp. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 708 F.2d 1081, 1132
(7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 891 (1983).
326. See id.
327. See id.
328. See id. at 1133.
329. See id.
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list's essential facility is greatly favored.33 0 For instance, in Oahu
Gas, the court held that the antitrust laws impose a special affirm-
ative duty on a monopolist due to its special position in the mar-
ket."3 ' "These duties are not absolute, however; they arise only
when there is no justification for refusing to aid a competitor."33 '
Mr. E would like to argue that C&W has no legitimate justification
for refusing to sell him waters.33
Before Mr. E must prove these four elements and seek some
sort of antitrust enforcement or damages, Mr. E and his attorney
should negotiate with C&W and its attorney. A knowledge of the
Essential Facility Doctrine is critical for Mr. E's attorney since
C&W would likely otherwise refuse to sell water to Mr. E. C&W's
potential liability might be sufficiently clear that C&W would
agree grudgingly to sell water to Mr. E.
Mr. E's attorney then should address the sale of water to Mr.
E at the same price that C&W sells water to other industrial
users.334 If C&W's sale of water falls within interstate commerce
for the Robinson-Patman Act,335 then C&W's attorney may simply
point to illegal price discrimination and suggest that C&W not vio-
late that law.336 Even if the Robinson-Patman Act does not apply
in this case, Mr. E's attorney can rely on the Montana antitrust
laws and the unfair price discrimination clause in those laws.3 37
Even though the Montana antitrust laws have not been litigated
frequently, section 30-14-104 of the Montana Code, which provides
for interpreting Montana's antitrust laws under federal law,3 38
could very well lead to Robinson-Patman-type interpretations of
the Montana law, without the necessity of the interstate commerce
330. Oahu Gas Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Resources, Inc., 838 F.2d 360, 369 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 488 U.S. 870 (1988).
331. Id. at 368.
332. Id.
333. Perpetuating a monopoly is not a legitimate justification for refusing to supply a
necessary facility. See id. at 368-69.
334. Assume that C&W wishes to sell its water to Mr. E at a higher price than C&W
sells its water to other industrial users for the purpose of driving Mr. E's costs higher to
obtain a competitive advantage.
335. This sale may not fall within the Robinson-Patman Act because of the interstate
commerce requirement, since C&W probably does not sell water outside Montana. See H.E.
Reeves, Inc. v. Laredo Ready Mix, Inc., 589 F. Supp. 132, 135 (S.D. Tex. 1984).
336. See Dean Milk Co. v. FTC, 395 F.2d 696, 705 (7th Cir. 1968). It is assumed in this
entire example that Mr. E's attorney will follow all applicable rules of ethics in discussions
with C&W or its attorneys.
337. MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-14-205(2)(b) (1991).
338. MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-14-104 (1991). See Assam Drug Co. v. Miller Brewing Co.,
798 F.2d 311 (8th Cir. 1986) (illustrating the use of federal law to interpret South Dakota's
state antitrust law).
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requirement.339 Based simply on the fact that Mr. E is a competi-
tor, this price discrimination would likely be illegal under Montana
law.3
40
Consequently, Mr. E should be able to enter the ready-mix
business in town. However, his most difficult hurdle is the second
issue-whether he will be able to survive in the ready-mix business
competing with a former market monopolist. The answer depends
to a great extent on his business skills and on his ability to weather
some lean years.3 41 The antitrust laws can provide some help to
Mr. E so that he can achieve some sort of parity with C&W and, in
some ways, level the playing field. For instance, if C&W attempts
to lower its prices below its costs of production, Mr. E would have
a viable predatory pricing claim, 42 because it is unlikely that C&W
would need to keep its prices at such low levels after driving Mr. E
from the market. 43
Mr. E also has available to him the typical state "business
torts." Additionally, some courts have held that pricing behavior
that is the subject of a business tort can also lead to antitrust lia-
bility. 4 4 In Associated Radio Service Co. v. Page Airways, Inc.,
one manufacturer attempted to drive a competitor from the mar-
ket by bribing that competitor's employees, stealing its trade
secrets, and filing frivolous lawsuits.3 45 The court held that while
none of these activities alone constituted antitrust liability, the
combination was sufficient for antitrust liability.3 4 s Since the time
of Associated Radio, courts have held that single actions, which
otherwise would simply be business torts, when used as an attempt
339. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-14-104 (1991).
340. MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-14-205(2)(b) (1991).
341. Assume that Mr. E has the proper business skills and capitalization to withstand
the first few years of business losses. Assume further that Mr. E is aware of his need to fight
C&W's name recognition and the other intangibles that will hinder his efforts to achieve a
viable market share.
342. See A.A. Poultry Farms, Inc. v. Rose Acre Farms, Inc., 881 F.2d 1396, 1399 (7th
Cir. 1989). See also MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-14-209 (1991) (providing lower standards).
343. Mr. E must be prepared, however, for the possibility that C&W's cost of produc-
ing concrete is lower than Mr. E's. In that case, C&W would not be engaging in predatory
pricing for selling its concrete at a lower price than it had previously charged, and at a price
lower than Mr. E's costs, but higher than its own costs. Mr. E would then need to show a
classic Sherman Act, Section Two, attempted monopolization case by establishing specific
intent to monopolize, exclusionary conduct, and a dangerous probability of success. See
A.B.A. ANTITRUST SEC., Antitrust Law Developments 139-40 (2d ed. 1984). The courts could
tell Mr. E that C&W's price reduction is exactly the benefit consumers should expect in a
competitive market. See id.
344. Associated Radio Serv. Co. v. Page Airways, Inc., 624 F.2d 1342, 1355 (5th Cir.
1980).
345. Id. at 1354.
346. Id. at 1357.
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to monopolize, can lead to antitrust liability.34 7
Mr. E may not be able to survive in the ready-mix market in
this small city. Nevertheless, the antitrust laws do provide him
with some assistance in dealing with C&W's conduct. Mr. E's at-
torney should make it clear to C&W and its attorney that Mr. E
will be vigilant in monitoring C&W's conduct. If C&W violates the
antitrust laws to Mr. E's detriment, Mr. E should not hesitate to
seek antitrust enforcement. 348
B. Antitrust Laws Help Small Businesses Defend Their
Market Positions Against Large Businesses
Large national businesses may have clear advantages over
small local businesses. They may be more diversified and better
able to enter new ventures and absorb losses. They may have more
extensive marketing networks and a better ability to generate capi-
tal. However, the antitrust laws can be used in some instances to
347. See Bonjorno v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 752 F.2d 802, 811 (3d Cir.
1984) (holding that harassment constituted an antitrust violation); Multiflex, Inc. v. Samuel
Moore & Co., 709 F.2d 980, 992-93 (5th Cir. 1983) (holding that commercial disparagement
constituted an antitrust violation); W.H. Brady Co. v. Lem Prods., Inc., 659 F. Supp. 1355,
1371 (N.D. Ill. 1987) (holding that the defendant failed to prove the plaintiff brought an
antitrust action for the purpose of harming the defendant as its competitor).
348. Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is not enforced against antitrust
plaintiffs very frequently so long as there is any sort of colorable claim. See Nassau-Suffolk
Ice Cream, Inc. v. Integrated Resources, Inc., 118 F.R.D. 45, 50 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (finding
sanctions not appropriate against plaintiff where information available prior to filing com-
plaint formed colorable claim); Norton Tire Co. v. Tire Kingdom Co., 116 F.R.D. 236, 240
IS.D. Fla. 1987) (finding no Rule 11 sanctions because counsel was entitled to file his anti-
trust claims hoping for a favorable market definition or that discovery would support his
claim). But see Danik, Inc. v. Hartmarx Corp., 120 F.R.D. 439, 445 (D.D.C. 1988) (involving
a failure to conduct adequate prefiling inquiry); Colorado Chiropractic Council v. Porter
Memorial Hosp., 650 F. Supp. 231, 239-40 (D. Colo. 1986) (plaintiffs did not even attempt to
seek right to practice their profession at defendant's hospital, therefore, could not possibly
have had standing for antitrust action, and sanctions under Rule 11 were appropriate). The
courts have held that the actual behavior and motives of the alleged offender are solely
within its knowledge and the plaintiff cannot be expected to know whether the overt actions
are a true violation until well into the discovery process. See Norton Tire, 116 F.R.D. at
239-40. Furthermore, while attorney fees are granted to prevailing plaintiffs under the fed-
eral antitrust laws, the defendant is not entitled to such fees. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1988); Byram
Concretanks, Inc. v. Warren Concrete Prods. Co., 374 F.2d 649, 651 (3d Cir. 1967) (quoted
with approval in Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 419 n.13 (1978)). See
also Koratron Co. v. Lion Uniform, Inc., 409 F. Supp. 1019, 1030 (N.D. Cal. 1976) (holding
that defendant may not recover attorney fees). The author is aware of only one reported
case where the defendant was awarded attorney fees in an antitrust action. See Syufy
Enter's v. American Multicinema, Inc., 602 F. Supp. 1466, 1472 (N.D. Cal. 1983) (involving
defendant who had also brought a counterclaim against the plaintiff, for which the attorney
fees were awarded), aff'd, 793 F.2d 990 (9th Cir. 1986). If the attorney believes that an
antitrust violation has occurred, Rule 11 and the award of attorney fees should not prevent
the filing of a suit.
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help the small business achieve some measure of parity with the
national giants. This Section explores one situation in which crea-
tive lawyering can help achieve such parity.
For example, one Montana city contains two manufacturers of
bicycle bells. 349 The two Montana manufacturers of bicycle bells,
Montana Bells and Biff's Bells, account for a total market share of
about fifteen percent of the national market.3 50 The sole share-
holder of Montana Bells wants to retire, and Biff wants to buy it
and expand, in effect practically doubling its market share. The
largest national competitor, Hells Bells, which holds approximately
seventy percent of the market share, also wants to purchase Mon-
tana Bells.
Hells Bells intends immediately upon purchase to close Mon-
tana's plant merely to acquire more market share. Given the fact
that Hells Bells probably can pay a much higher price to purchase
the business, Biff may feel powerless. Furthermore, even if a po-
tential Clayton Act merger violation may occur, Biff probably can-
not bring a private lawsuit.3 51
Even though Biff may not have standing to bring a private
antitrust action under the Clayton Act,3 52 Biff is not completely
without recourse. The Federal Trade Commission exists for just
such occasions.3 53 A person may request an FTC investigation of a
potential merger whether or not a Hart-Scott-Rodino filing was re-
quired.3 54 This request should be sent to the regional FTC office3 55
349. Assume for purposes of this hypothetical example these facts: the geographic
market is worldwide due to the light weight of the bicycle bells; bicycle bells are a distinct,
relevant product market, defined as devices to be affixed to the handle bars of young chil-
dren's bicycles, which ring mechanically; cross-elasticity studies show that bicycle horns and
other noisome devices are not substitutable for bicycle bells; and there are a total of five
bicycle bell manufacturers in the United States, two of which are in Montana, and four
additional bicycle bell manufacturers in other parts of the world. Further assume the bells
manufactured in the United States wholesale for approximately $2 each, and the bells man-
ufactured in other parts of the world wholesale at a price which is so close to $2 each that
consumers will pay the additional amount for the American-made bicycle bells made from
superior steel and with a superior design. While this example may seem fanciful, it is identi-
cal to a real fact situation except that the product, in reality, was not bicycle bells.
350. Each has an equal seven and one-half percent share of the product market.
351. See Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 111 (1986). Biff will not
have standing because it has not suffered an antitrust injury yet. Id. First, Biff has not yet
suffered any actual damages. Second, Biff is a competitor, not a customer of the monopolist.
See Atlantic Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328, 337 (1990) (evidencing the
Rehnquist Court's attempt to dilute the federal antitrust laws).
352. See Cargill, 479 U.S. at 111, 116.
353. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-77 (1988). See also discussion of Federal Trade Commission
Act, supra notes 222-53 and accompanying text.
354. 16 C.F.R. § 2.1 (1992).
355. The regional office for Montana is at 1405 Curtis Street, Suite 2900, Denver, Col-
orado 80202.
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and should be sent by the business itself, rather than by the
attorney.
The attorney, however, should expend significant effort help-
ing the client prepare this letter. The FTC will investigate the pro-
posed merger using a standard Clayton Act analysis."' Conse-
quently, if the request for an investigation can provide information
to the FTC in the light least favorable to the merger, the FTC's
first understanding of the case may lead it to give greater scrutiny
to the merger.
The person making the request may wish to help the FTC de-
fine the relevant market.3 57 If trade organizations or publications
that help define either this market or the product, these publica-
tions should be supplied to the FTC. Justice Department merger
guidelines consider such factors as transportation costs, shipment
patterns, and costs of distribution.3 58 If the product market defini-
tion 59 and the geographic market definition ss° are provided to the
FTC at the outset, the FTC will more likely agree on those defini-
tions most favorable to the client.381
If the requestor of the investigation can access the market
shares and concentration in the product market as defined directly
through its own knowledge, or indirectly through trade industry
sources, 6 ' the investigation will be expedited. The practitioner
should provide as much information as possible to ascertain both
the four-firm concentration ratio363 and the Herfindahl-Hirschman
Index before and after the proposed merger. 6 4 If this information
is not available, that fact should be given to the FTC as how to
gather this information.
356. Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 333.
357. The definition of one of the participants is usually accepted. See Times-Picayune
Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 614 (1953) (Times-Picayune Company was
able to convince the Court that advertising in the evening newspaper is the same product as
advertising in the morning newspaper); Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143,
147 n.4 (1951) (involving market definitions in a judicial setting).
358. 1984 MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 167 § 2.32, at 9.
359. Id. § 2.1, at 4-6.
360. Id. § 2.3, at 8-11.
361. For instance, in R.C. Bigelow, the court accepted a national geographic market
and the herbal tea product market but commented that a better product market might have
been all hot beverages. R.C. Bigelow, Inc. v. Unilever N.V., 867 F.2d 102, 110 (2d Cir. 1989).
It would seem that someone was successful at selling a product market definition to the
court.
362. These sources should be disclosed to the FTC for its own independent
investigation.
363. United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 331 (1963).
364. 1984 MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 167 § 3.11, at 14-15. These guidelines, pub-
lished by the United States Justice Department, are also used by the Federal Trade
Commission.
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Any of the additional issues that the FTC may consider in the
particular investigation should also be addressed in the requesting
letter. For instance, if significant barriers to entry in the bicycle
bell industry such as excessive costs of equipment exist, these fac-
tors may be quite important. 6 5 If the person requesting the inves-
tigation can anticipate that certain defenses will be raised, the let-
ter requesting the investigation should address these defenses. 6
The more issues that can be anticipated and addressed in the ini-
tial request for an investigation, the better the chances are that the
FTC's investigation will be beneficial to Biff.
Being the target of an FTC investigation may be sufficient to
cause Hells Bells to decide not to pursue the purchase. Hells Bells
may desire to remain out of the sights of the FTC. In a case such
as the bicycle bell manufacturing case, the market concentration
alone should be high enough to cause the FTC to intervene. 67 The
FTC may well decide, however, that intervention is not advisable
because the barriers to entry in the bicycle bell industry are so
low.36 8 Should the FTC decide to intervene, it can seek an injunc-
tion halting the merger or divestiture if the merger has already
occurred. 69
Biff may be reluctant to request an investigation by the FTC
for fear of retaliation by Hells Bells. FTC investigations are, how-
ever, exempted from Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) disclo-
sure by the trade secret and investigative exemptions to the
FOIA.3 70 Consequently, unless the business or its employees dis-
close that it sought an investigation, the FTC ought not disclose
either the identity of a person seeking the investigation or whether
365. Id. at 18. See also United States v. Sybron Corp., 329 F. Supp. 919, 929 (E.D. Pa.
1971).
366. For instance, the Failing Firm Defense is quite often raised. This defense is
treated in 1984 MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 167 § 5.1, at 31. See also Brown Shoe, 370
U.S. at 346; United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486, 507 (1974). In General
Dynamics, the Court explains the Failing Firm Defense as the lesser of two evils. Id. Two
interest must be balanced. On one hand, the community has an interest in keeping people
employed. On the other hand, the community has an interest in avoiding the adverse impact
on competition of a firm's going out of business entirely coupled with the potential threat to
competition caused by the prospective merger. Id.
367. The 77 1/2 % that Hells Bells would have would be well in excess of the market
share necessary to demonstrate "dangerous probability of success," Domed Stadium Hotel,
Inc. v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 732 F.2d 480, 490 (5th Cir. 1984), and is a postmerger HHI of at
least 6062.5. 1984 MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 167 § 3.1, at 13-14.. Consequently, the
merger should elicit a great deal of scrutiny.
368. See, e.g., Ball Memorial Hosp., Inc. v. Mutual Hosp. Ins., Inc., 784 F.2d 1325,
1339 (7th Cir. 1986).
369. 15 U.S.C. § 41 (1988).
370. 5 U.S.C. §§ 552(b)(4), (b)(7) (1988).
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it initiated the investigation on its own initiative.3 71 Furthermore,
the FTC may not divulge any information provided by the re-
quester that could identify the requester in any way. 2
Whether the FTC investigation leads to further Commission
action or not, Biff may be able to chill Hells Bells' zeal to acquire
Montana Bells or slow the process enough to make other business
adjustments. The antitrust laws can be used in this proactive way
to help Montana businesses compete with national corporations on
a more level playing field.
VI. CONCLUSION
Lack of awareness of antitrust law among lawyers for small
businesses is dangerous because of increasing enforcement against
small businesses and the need of those businesses to creatively use
every tool available, even antitrust law, to maintain their market
positions and to grow while competing with national giants. The
business lawyer must be aware of potential antitrust violations as
small businesses become more visible in national and international
markets. Perhaps most important, however, the alert business law-
yer will find many opportunities to use antitrust law for the benefit
of the business client trying to compete with national companies
for market share and, in some instances, for survival. The creative
use of antitrust law may provide one of the few little-used advan-
tages for a small business in competition today. This Article pro-
vides a beginning for the practitioner to become more aware of an-
titrust issues in small business practice. The practitioner should
not hesitate to enter this field of business law too often overlooked
by small business lawyers.
371. 5 U.S.C. §§ 552(b)(4), (b)(7) (1988).
372. 5 U.S.C. §§ 552(b)(4), (b)(7) (1988).
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